William H. Frey

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No. 94-314

Research Reports



Population Studies Center
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The New Geography of U.S. Population Shifts: Trends toward Balkanization

No. 94-314

Research Report
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ABSTRACT

Urban growth and migration patterns in America continue to shift in unexpected ways and are creating sharper divisions across space. This review of 1990 census findings emphasizes the following trends which emerged over the 1980s and are likely to characterize the 1990s as well: First, there is a return to urbanization -- countering the redistribution reversals of the 1970s. Second, there is the increased regional separation of minorities and whites that has accompanied the heightened immigration from Latin America and Asia. Third, there are regional divisions by skill-level and poverty such that the geography of opportunities is quite different for college graduates, than for high school dropouts. Fourth, sharp age and cohort disparities, across space, are emerging -- especially between the elderly cohorts and the baby boomers. Finally, there is a growing disparity between middle class suburbanites and city minority and poverty populations.

The portrait painted here is one of widening divisions. What is new with the trends of the 1980s and 1990s are redistribution patterns which reinforce divisions across broad regions and metropolitan areas. A demographic balkanization is a likely outcome if these trends continue. The large multi-ethnic port-of-entry metros will house decidedly younger, more diverse, and ethnically vibrant populations than the more staid, white older populations in declining regions, while the more educated middle-aged populations will reside in the most prosperous regions. The geographic boundaries that take shape according to these distinctions will surely bring profound changes to established economic and political alliances as well as to the lifestyles and attitudes of residents of these areas.

Data source: Decennial US census data

THE NEW GEOGRAPHY OF US POPULATION SHIFTS:
TRENDS TOWARD BALKANIZATION

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A. NEW DIVISIONS ACROSS SPACE

Urban growth and migration patterns in America continue to shift in unexpected ways and are creating sharper divisions across space. Back in the 1970s, urban scholars were baffled by the so-called "rural renaissance" when rural and small communities in most parts of the country grew faster than large metropolises -- reversing decades of urban concentration. Later, a broad review of that period's reversals concluded that the 1970s were really a "transition decade" for U.S. population redistribution where the "transition" referred to new social and economic contexts for redistribution rather than to specific geographic patterns.[1] Since then, the geography of growth has again shifted, as industrial restructuring and the global economy have created more fast-paced and unpredictable distribution dynamics for the 1980s and 1990s.[2]

Just as these new redistribution forces began to take shape, increasingly large waves of immigrants from abroad began to pour into selected parts of the country. These immigrant waves are dominated by racial and ethnic minorities from Latin America and Asia, and impact heavily on the sizes, diversity profiles and economies of their destination areas. They add vibrancy and vitality to these communities, but also contribute to dislocations and increased government spending.

With these new and evolving redistribution contexts, population shifts do not necessarily adhere to familiar classifications -- snowbelt-and-sunbelt, rural-and-urban, or even city-and-suburb. Minority segregation is no longer confined just to individual neighborhoods or communities. In fact, new patterns of immigration and internal migration, segmented by race, ethnicity, class and age appear to be leading to patterns of demographic "balkanization" across broad regions and metropolitan areas.

While recognizing the ever-dynamic state of the nation's population geography, this review of 1990 census findings emphasizes the following trends which emerged over the 1980s and are likely to characterize the 1990s as well.

1. An Uneven Urban Revival First, there is a return to urbanization -- countering the redistribution reversals of the 1970s. (See Figure 1). No longer considered a "rural renaissance", the 1970s redistribution reversals are now viewed as the product of period economic and demographic forces which favored selected small and nonmetropolitan area growth, and an industrial restructuring which reduced the job generating capacities of many northern manufacturing centers. Yet, the new metropolitan growth patterns since 1980 are not simply a replay of 1950s- and 1960s-style urbanization. They reflect a continuing national industrial structuring that favors areas with diversified economies and, in particular, those engaged in advanced services and knowledge-based industries. Recreation and retirement centers also fare well. Yet, many small and nonmetropolitan areas, especially in the nation's interior, fared poorly as a result of the adverse 1980s period influences as well as their dependence on, now, less than competitive bases. In short, the new urbanization has created sharp economic and demographic growth distinctions across regions and places.

(Figure 1 here)

2. Regional Racial Divisions A second emerging trend is the increased regional separation of minorities and whites that has accompanied an apparent nationally more diverse population. The heightened immigration from Latin America and Asia, as well as the population gains among native-born minorities, has led to a strong nation-wide growth advantage for the minority versus the majority (non-Hispanic) white population. Yet these national growth disparities play out quite differently across broad regions, states and metropolitan areas. In the 1980s, more than two-thirds of minority-dominated immigrants were directed to only seven states -- led by California, New York and Texas. (See upper map in Figure 2). Not only do these


Metropolitan-Non Metropolitan Growth*
METRO AREAS > 1 Million
METRO AREAS < 1 Million
NON METRO AREAS
Percent Growth in Decade
20
15
10
5
0
18.5%
14.7%
2.6%
8.1%
15.5%
14.3%
12.1%
10.8%
3.8%
1960-70
1970-80
1980-90

Figure 1

immigrants impact upon the race-ethnic profiles of these states' populations, they represent increased competition with native residents for jobs and housing opportunities. This competition contributes to the fact that most states which received large numbers of immigrants also lost mostly white internal migrants to other parts of the country.[3] (See lower panel of Figure 2). While each minority group exhibits different distribution tendencies, the sharp majority-minority distinction across broad regions and metropolitan areas will affect the social and political character of these areas.

(Figure 2 here)

3. Regional Divisions by Skill Level and Poverty As Frank Levy points out in his chapter on income inequality, the 1980s was a decade when the income disparity widened between college graduates and those with lesser educations. This trend complements the geographic labor market disparities in industrial structure where areas that specialize in advanced services and knowledge-based industries are differentiated from those that are engaged in production and manufacturing activities. Together, these trends are creating different redistribution patterns, respectively, for the more- and less-educated segments of the population -- for which the geography of opportunities have become quite different. More so than other population groups, the poverty population is even less likely to follow mainstream redistribution patterns.

4. Baby-boom and Elderly Re-alignments While not as severe as for race and ethnic groups, segmented redistribution patterns are also evident among cohorts and age groups. For example, as the early baby boom cohorts entered the labor market in the mid-1970s, the deindustrialization in large northern metropolitan areas sent them scurrying to selected South and West destinations. As this chapter will show, the later baby boom cohorts (born after 1955) followed different paths as they entered the job market during the 1980s. Yet, a very different redistribution pattern from both boomer cohorts is displayed by the elderly population whose numbers and disposable incomes

Migration From Abroad 1985-90



Net Interstate Migration 1985-90



FIGURE 2

Source: Tabulations of "Residence 5 Years Ago" Question from 1990 U.S. Census

have risen substantially over the past two decades. For them, amenities and the low living costs take preference over an area's economic vitality. Especially during the 1980s, the retired elderly became a unique and important segment of the overall redistribution pattern.

5. Suburban Dominance and City Isolation The 1980s is the decade when the suburbs achieved the undisputed dominance as the locus of population and jobs. The broad expanse of territory outside of central cities has now become the primary activity space for the majority of metropolitan residents. (See Figure 3.) Particularly telling is the new practice of state-wide or national political candidates to appeal to suburban -- rather than traditional central city -- constituency voters. Political analysts attribute the 1992 election of Democratic presidential candidate, Bill Clinton, to his success with suburban voters.[4] Joel Garreau's Edge Cities points to the existence of suburban office and commercial complexes.[5] Suburban areas have captured the bulk of employment and residential growth in the 1980s. The modal commuter both lives and works in the suburbs, and several suburban cities have begun to rival their historically dominant central cities in the production of export goods and services.[6] America's suburbs are no longer the homogeneous "Leave it to Beaver" bedroom communities of the 1950s. At the same time, the race and class divisions between central cities and suburbs have intensified.

(Figure 3 here)

Each of these emerging divisions are discussed in this chapter on geographic distribution trends. It is important to emphasize that some of the sharpest demographic divisions are occurring across broad regions -- including entire states or metropolitan areas. These are underscored in the first four trends listed and are discussed, respectively, in Sections B, C, D and E. Suburban dominance and its effects

City - Suburb Shares of Metropolitan Populations*



*Using Central City and Suburb Definitions at Each Census

Figure 3

on demographic shifts within metropolitan areas including city suburb status gaps, minority suburbanization and neighborhood segregation as discussed in Sections F, G and H. The concluding section (Section I) illuminates the key findings of this chapter which point to sharper spatial separation of demographic groups -- both across and within regions -- for the decade ahead..

B. A RETURN TO THE METROPOLIS -- WITH VARIATIONS

A renewed metropolitan growth is evident from Figure 1 which shows that the nation's combined metropolitan population grew at a faster rate over the 1980s than did the entire nonmetropolitan population. In this sense, it is a return to the well-established urban growth advantage of prior decades. Yet, underlying these broad metropolitan gains are fairly sharp differences in the growth rates of individual metropolitan areas as a result of the economic restructuring, and immigration.

REGIONAL RESTRUCTURING

Although several explanations were proposed to account for the redistribution reversals of the 1970s, the regional restructuring explanation appears to account best for both those reversals, and the selective urban revival of the 1980s and 1990s.[7] This explanation saw the deindustrialization-related metropolitan declines of the 1970s as only a temporary episode leading toward a new spatial organization of work. This new organization is associated with expanding world-wide markets, improved communications and the rise of multi-national corporations. According to this view, new urban growth should emerge after the industrial "downsizing" had taken place. Key metropolitan areas in this resurgence were expected to be headquarter centers for

corporations, banks and other "advanced service" activities.[8] Growth was also expected for areas with "knowledge-based" industries associated with high-tech research and development. The idea is that these kinds of industries still benefit from agglomeration economies. On the other hand, metropolitan areas that were not well diversified or that could not make the production-to-services transformation were predicted to experience unstable growth prospects. These areas' growth or decline are very dependent on external economic conditions where decisions are made at far-away corporate headquarters (in the case of branch plant downsizing) or government agencies (in the case of obtaining state or federal contracts for defense work and the like). This explanation contrasts sharply with a prevalent 1970s prediction that a "rural renaissance"-type population deconcentration would continue.

MAJOR METRO AREAS

The nation's largest metropolitan areas provide a good point of departure because their 1970s to 1980s growth resurgence was most dramatic. Major metropolitan areas are typically considered to be those with populations that exceed one million.[9] In 1990, 39 such areas achieved "major metro" status. For the first time in the country's history, a majority of the population resided in these major metros. What was most significant about these metros during the 1980s is the changes in their patterns from the previous decade.

Heavily affected by the period's deindustrialization, eight major metros -- located primarily in the "rust belt" -- actually lost population back in the 1970s. Of these, only Pittsburgh and Cleveland continued to lose population in the last half of the 1980s. This suggests that the deindustrialization-driven losses for those areas have run their course -- lending support to the industrial restructuring explanation of urban growth.

This restructuring explanation is also supported when individual areas' 1970s-to-1980s growth changes are linked to their respective industrial structures. Figure 4 displays both decades' growth rates for the 25 largest metropolitan areas in the country. For the most part, metro areas with diversified economies and those that serve as corporate headquarter and advanced service centers tended to improve their growth prospects in the 1980s. This is the case with New York, Philadelphia and Boston in the Northeast; with Minneapolis-St. Paul and Kansas City in the Midwest; with Washington, DC, Dallas-Ft. Worth and Atlanta in the South; and with Los Angeles, San Francisco-Oakland and Seattle in the West. An exception to the rule is Chicago, a major metro with a diverse economy that continued to decline in the late 1980s. The patterns in Figure 4 also make plain that the seemingly large 1970s gainers were not necessarily consistent ones. Metro areas whose economies were heavily dominated by particular industries run the risk of experiencing boom-then-bust periods. This is the case with Houston and Denver, whose economies were strongly tied to oil and extractive industries.

(Figure 4 about here)

An additional ingredient toward explaining the different growth levels of these metro areas is immigration from abroad. Immigration streams tend to be directed to a selected number of "port-of-entry" areas, and can contribute substantially to their population gains. Migration data from the 1990 census indicate that all of the 1985-90 migration gains for Los Angeles, New York, and San Francisco can be attributed to migration from abroad. In contrast, the lion's share of migration gains for Atlanta, Seattle, and Phoenix draw from internal migration from other parts of the country.



Figure 4: Percent Decade Change for Largest Metropolitan Areas, 1980-90 as compared to 1970-80.

METRO VS. NONMETRO, "THE BELTS" AND "THE COASTS"

The restructuring influences on major metropolitan areas, notwithstanding, the growth and later decline of the nation's nonmetropolitan territory was driven largely by period economic circumstances. The interplay of these dynamics -- restructuring and period economic influences -- also altered the geographic character of Snowbelt-to-Sunbelt redistribution since 1980.

Snowbelt to Sunbelt in the 1970s. The broad tapestry of these changes can be seen in Table 1 which displays growth rates across regions and metropolitan categories over the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. These data make plain the strong link that existed between population shifts across the metropolitan-nonmetropolitan dimension, and those that existed across the regional dimension. Most of the nation's metropolitan area losses during the 1970s were borne by large metropolitan areas in the North. At the same time, a large share of national small- and non-metropolitan area gains were concentrated in the Sunbelt (South and West) regions.

(Table 1 about here)

The Snowbelt major metro declines were generated by the deindustrialization, restructuring influences discussed earlier. At the same time, a variety of period-specific economic "pulls" made smaller Sunbelt areas particularly attractive destinations. Among these were the mid-decade energy crisis which spurred extractive energy development in the Southwest, Mountain West, and Appalachia; recession-related relocations of manufacturing jobs to low-wage, non-union communities in the Southeast; and a surprising world-wide food shortage which temporarily stunted out-migration from rural farming areas in all parts of the country. During this period, as well, particularly large birth cohorts entered their retirement ages and gravitated to warmer amenity-laden communities in the Sunbelt. Together, these period influences forged a link between northern large metro decline and Sunbelt small area gains.

Table 1: Population Change by Metropolitan Status and Region

Region Metropolitan Status**	1990 Size (millions)	Percent 10 year change 1960-1970	 1970-1980	 1980-1990	INTERIOR * Percent 5 year change 1980-1985	 1985-1990	COASTAL* Percent 5 year change 1980-1985	 1985-1990
NORTHEAST AND MIDWEST								
Large Metropolitan	62.9	12.0	-0.9	2.8	0.8	2.2	1.8	0.9
Other Metropolitan	25.6	11.1	5.2	3.3	0.5	1.6	1.6	3.6
Nonmetropolitan	22.6	2.6	8.0	0.1	0.2	-2.0	1.9	3.5
SOUTH								
Large Metropolitan	28.2	30.9	23.4	22.3	16.0	4.6	10.1	11.5
Other Metropolitan	31.9	15.5	20.9	13.4	7.8	1.3	10.3	8.1
Nonmetropolitan	24.9	1.1	16.3	4.6	4.5	-3.0	5.4	3.5
WEST								
Large Metropolitan	33.8	29.1	20.0	24.2	16.4	7.3	10.0	12.8
Other Metropolitan	10.8	24.8	32.2	22.8	11.6	11.7	11.3	9.3
Nonmetropolitan	8.1	9.0	30.6	14.1	9.2	2.1	8.9	7.8

* Interior and Coastal portions of Regions are defined in terms of Census Regions and Divisions:
North Coastal: Northeast Region
North Interior: Midwest Region:
South Coastal: South Atlantic Division
South Interior: East South Central and West South Central Divisions
West Coastal: Pacific Division
West Interior: Mountain Division

* Large Metropolitan includes metropolitan areas with 1990 populations exceeding one million

Source: Compiled at University of Michigan Population Studies Center from Decennial Census data and 1985 estimates prepared by the Census Bureau Population Division

Bi-Coastal Gains in the 1980s. Just as the northern metropolitan declines served to fuel increased population growth in the Sunbelt during the 1970s, the urban revival served to slow the pace of this growth in the 1980s. The nation's Sunbelt regions still showed a considerable growth advantage over the Northeast and Midwest, but this margin became reduced, especially for the South as the 1980s decade wore on.

To a large extent, this occurred because the 1970s link between northern large metro decline and Sunbelt small area growth reversed itself. Within the Sunbelt, the greatest 1970s-to-1980s growth slow-downs occurred for smaller, and nonmetropolitan areas. Seventy-three of 85 small Sunbelt metros grew at slower rates (or declined) in the 1980s than in the 1970s. At the other extreme, 15 of the 18 northern major metro areas grew faster in the 1980s.

These changes occurred because restructuring influences turned to favor growth in several large Snowbelt (and Sunbelt) metros, but also because new period influences adversely affected small-town and rural growth through parts of the South and West. Ironically, these were reversals of the same period influences that spawned 1970s growth in these areas. Small-town manufacturing jobs dried up during the early 1980s as the strong dollar reduced demand abroad. The agricultural shortages of the '70s became a surplus in the 1980s leading to out-migration in rural farm communities. But perhaps most important, was the fall of world-wide petroleum prices in the mid-1980s which very quickly turned boom to bust for large stretches of the "oil patch region" of the Sunbelt -- including Texas. Louisiana and Oklahoma.[10]

These effects were most devastating for the interior portions of the South and West, and particularly over the late 1980s (see Table 1 and Figure 5). During the 1985-90 period, interior South small metro areas grew negligibly, nonmetropolitan areas declined and the entire region's population growth grew by less than one percent.[11] Oil-dependent Odessa, Texas shifted from a growth rate of 17% in the first half of the 1980s to a decline of -12% in the decade's last five years.



Figure 5: Fast Growing and Declining Metropolitan Areas, 1985-1990

* Growth Rate 2.5 times the National Growth Rate

(Figure 5 here)

In contrast, coastal Sunbelt areas fared far better than the interior regions during this period. The generally higher levels of growth can be attributed, in part, to amenities and recreation, but also to the emergence of growing regional centers with diversified economies (e.g. Atlanta) and the rise of knowledge-based industries (e.g., in the Research Triangle area of North Carolina). During the late 1980s, 15 of the nation's fastest growing metropolitan areas were located in the South Atlantic region or in California. Orlando, Florida increased its metro population by more than one-fifth over this five-year period. These patterns not only point up the emergence of new growth locations, but also the volatility of growth and decline in response to national and global industrial restructuring.

THE RURAL RENAISSANCE -- A POSTMORTEM

In retrospect, the rural renaissance was an aberration of the 1970s. When initially detected, many observers felt that technology and the loosening of distance constraints would free both employers and workers from the noose of locating in high-density, congested urban environments.[12] They thought that Americans' long-held preference to live in small communities could finally be achieved and the eventual down-sizing of large metropolitan areas was forecasted.[13] The population shifts of the 1980s have shown that this stress on environmental preferences in explaining these earlier trends was overemphasized. Most of the 1970s nonmetropolitan growth, as well as the 1980s slow-downs and declines, were driven by period-specific economic forces related to low-tech manufacturing, oil extraction and agriculture. The former growth was further fueled by the wholesale elimination of manufacturing jobs in the nation's largest urban centers. In short, the rosy "rural renaissance" predictions of the '70s

failed to consider the mix of period and restructuring influences that helped provide the illusion of a new era of dispersed settlement.

Still, there are parts of nonmetropolitan America that continued to attract growth all through the 1980s. Some of these can be classed as retirement counties in all parts of the country, but especially in Florida, the upper Great Lakes, Southwest and West. Flagler County, Florida increased its elderly population by 266% over the 1980s -- topping the country in elderly growth.[14] A substantial number of nonmetropolitan areas have increased their elderly populations significantly in Nevada (Nye at 166%), Alaska (Kenai Peninsula at 147%), Arizona (Mohave at 126%) and other western states. Owing to their high amenities and low cost of living, these counties attract retirees with discretionary incomes that contribute to their further economic development.[15] A second kind of rural area that sustained growth during the 1980s were "exurban" counties that lie adjacent to metropolitan areas and show strong connectivity via commuting.

Both the "footloose" elderly residents of retirement counties and the commuting residents of exurban counties are able to benefit from the amenities of rural life without necessarily depending on their economies for employment. Yet, many more interior nonmetropolitan counties were beset by selective out-migration, population aging, limited infrastructures and poverty. The future for them is less than rosy and their further revival will require greater industrial diversification that extends far beyond the resource-based and temporary manufacturing growth that buoyed them in the 1970s.[16]

C. NATIONAL MINORITY GAINS -- REGIONAL DIVISIONS

A significant ingredient of American demographic change over the 1980s was the growth of its minority population. Over the decade, the combined minorities (blacks, Hispanics, Asians, and others) grew by almost one-third -- more than seven times the

4.4 percent growth of the non-Hispanic white population.[17] If these trends continue, it is possible that the nation would become almost 50 percent minority by the year 2050.[18] Much of this growth, particularly for Asians and Hispanics, owes to immigration from abroad. Primarily due to fertility differences, black growth also exceeded that of whites by a ratio of 3 to 1. What is important for population redistribution within the U.S. is the fact that most of the nation's minority growth over the decade was directed to selected regions and a relatively small number of metropolitan areas -- which differed substantially from the areas of white gain. The potential long-term impact of these trends cannot be overlooked. Just as past racial and ethnic segregation took place at the neighborhood and community level, these trends portend a broader-based segregation across large areas of the country.

UNEVEN RACIAL GAINS

Even at the regional level, whites and minorities show distinctly different distributions. For example, close to half of the white population resides in the nation's Northeast and Midwest, as contrasted to less than one-third for the combined minorities. This is understandable because immigrants as well as second generation Asians and Hispanics are more likely to settle near West-Coast or Southwest port-of-entry areas than is the case for whites. For blacks, the modal region of residence is still the South, followed by the two Northern regions.

Across metropolitan-nonmetropolitan categories, whites are far less likely to reside in major metro areas, and far more likely to reside in nonmetropolitan areas than is the case for each of the three minority groups. Again, major "ports-of-entry" for recently arrived Asians and Hispanics tend to be larger metropolitan areas, accounting for the fact that about seven of ten members of each group reside in such areas. The figure drops to six of ten for blacks, who are more likely to reside in (southern) nonmetropolitan areas than these two groups, but are still more urbanized than whites overall.

What is important to note is that these white-minority differences have not become moderated, as a result of redistribution over the 1980s.[19] The high immigration-driven growth of Asians and Hispanics actually reinforced these differences. Among blacks, there was a relocation away from large northern metro areas toward major metros in the South, along with some movement to the West for communities of all sizes. These patterns represent the ascendancy of more blacks into the middle class and, hence, participation in a more nation-wide migration network, as well as some element of return migration to the South. Whites were the one group whose 1980s redistribution patterns did not distinctly reinforce existing location types. There was a modest shift away from the Northeast and Midwest regions, resulting, largely, from employment dislocations linked to various boom and bust areas, as well as strong flows of elderly whites to selected Sunbelt retirement areas. Still, the overall white-minority regional and metropolitan disparities remained intact over the decade. This occurred despite the high levels of minority growth over the decade which held the potential for increased integration.

IMMIGRATION-INTERNAL MIGRATION DYNAMICS

Disparities in minority and white population distribution during the 1980s draw, largely, from the interplay of immigration and internal migration dynamics during this decade. New immigrant cohorts tended to gravitate to major "port-of-entry" areas.[20] As a result, states and metropolitan areas which received large inflows of immigrants also received large inflows of minorities. Black distribution patterns differ from those of Asians and Latinos, but remain distinct from majority whites.[21] The availability of existing black communities in their traditional areas of residence still remains a powerful incentive for black migration streams.

White migration is more nation-wide in scope, and by virtue of its magnitude, dominates internal migration patterns. The migration patterns of professional, well-educated whites responds sharply to the economic "pushes: and "pulls" of the national

labor market.[22] Whites with lesser incomes or more locally oriented blue- and pink-collar jobs are less likely to make long-distance moves but are, nonetheless, responsive to strong economic "pushes" from declining areas. In addition, the growing segment of retired elderly whites also contributes significantly to national internal migration streams.[23] States and metropolitan areas with growing employment or high amenities soon become destinations for white-dominated internal migration streams. Likewise, areas with sharp or prolonged economic downturns and Snowbelt areas with large cohorts of soon-to-be-retired elderly will be the source of white-dominated out-migration streams to other parts of the country.

Impacts on States. This distinction between minority-dominated immigration streams and white-dominated internal migration streams is particularly relevant to the 1980s when a disparity emerged between areas that grew predominantly from the former, and areas that grew predominantly from the latter. The States that grew primarily from immigration include California, New York, Texas, New Jersey, Illinois and Massachusetts. These states contain traditional port-of-entry cities and metropolitan areas and, therefore, benefitted from the large surge of national immigrant growth. The importance of the immigration component for these states' population growth cannot be overstated. In all except one (California), migration from abroad was the total source of gains during the 1985-90 period.[24] Each of the other states lost internal migrants in their exchanges with the rest of the country. Even in California, the large immigration from abroad overwhelmed the relatively small internal migration gain for this period (1.5 million versus less than 200,000). Clearly, these states had less appeal for internal migrants than did other parts of the country.

States that grew primarily from internal migration over the 1985-90 period are clustered in the economically booming South Atlantic region as well as in the West. The largest gains accrued to Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, Virginia, Washington and Arizona -- states which benefited from the largely, coastal restructuring and amenity-

related economic gains discussed earlier. While immigration also contributes to these states' gains, only Florida might be considered one of the country's major immigration magnets. But its substantial immigration from abroad (almost 400,000 over the 1985-90 period) is dwarfed by net internal migration gains from other parts of the country (totaling over one million for the late 1980s).

The relative impact of the minority-dominated immigration of the former states can be contrasted with that of white-dominated internal migration for the latter by examining Figure 6. Both California's and New York's minority compositions are increased as a result of these dynamics. California's large minority-dominated immigration stream overwhelms the effect of internal migration. In New York, a minority-dominant immigrant flow displaces a white-dominant out-migration. This general pattern also characterizes migration dynamics for Texas, New Jersey, Illinois and Massachusetts. For each of these states, there is a net gain of minorities and net loss of whites as a result of these immigration-internal migration streams.

(Figure 6 here)

Contrasting patterns of white gain are shown for Florida and Georgia as a result of the white-dominant internal migration increases accruing to these states in the late 1980s. Similar white gains are shown for other states where internal migration is the major contributor of recent growth. (In several southern states, including Georgia and Virginia, blacks make a significant contribution to new in-migration as well.) A broad swath of states in the nation's Rust Belt, Farm Belt, and Oil Patch regions lost whites due to internal migration to other parts of the country, as a result of their stagnant or declining economies. The patterns of two such states, Louisiana and Michigan, are depicted on Figure 6. Unlike the large port-of-entry states, these states were not able to recoup their net internal migration losses with large numbers of immigrants from abroad.



Figure 6: Migration From Abroad and Net Internal Migration by Race Selected Sates.

Source: Tabulations of "Residence 5 Years Ago" Question from 1990 US Census

The above dynamics, if continued, suggest a scenario where a few immigrant port-of-entry states will continue to gain bigger minority populations while losing whites to other prosperous areas. This could eventually lead to a racial and ethnic "balkanization" pattern arising from regional differences in racial compositions, age structures and other demographic attributes which separate immigrant minorities from the majority white population.[25] Of course, this prediction assumes that the late 1980s "flight" from high immigration states will continue, and that it is precipitated by aspects of the immigration itself -- competition for jobs and housing, or the avoidance of a variety of social costs associated with the assimilation of large numbers of immigrants into the area.

Two aspects of the out-movement from these states give credence to the view that areas in immigration-related push. First, the out-migration is led by whites with lower incomes and less than college educations. (This low-income out-migration pattern is also evident for California). This differs from conventional long-distance migration which typically selects on the most educated, and indicates response to job competition of low-skilled immigrants. Second, this out-migration involves a spreading to adjacent states (e.g., to Oregon, Nevada and Arizona from California, to Wisconsin from Illinois, to Pennsylvania from New Jersey, to Arkansas from Texas) and to other diffuse destinations, suggesting a response to an origin "push" rather than to sharp destination "pulls".[26]

Impacts on Metro Areas. The impacts of minority-dominated immigration and white-dominated internal migration streams can be even sharper for individual metro areas. Distinct immigration and internal migration impacts are clearly shown for the different categories of metro areas listed in Table 2.

(Table 2 here)

The 10 "high immigration" metropolitan areas are shown in the top panel, led by Los Angeles and New York. These constitute dominant port-of-entry areas for

Table 2: Metropolitan Areas Classed by Dominant Immigration and Internal Migration Contributions to Population Change, 1985-1990

Rank	State	Contribution to 1985-1990 Change (1000s) Migration from Abroad *	Net Interstate Migration **	1990 Percent White
I. HIGH IMMIGRATION METROS a				
1	LOS ANGELES	899	-175	50
2	NEW YORK	756	-1,066	63
3	SAN FRANCISCO	293	-103	61
4	MIAMI	211	45	48
5	WASHINGTON DC	191	34	63
6	CHICAGO	180	-293	67
7	BOSTON	120	-117	87
8	SAN DIEGO	116	127	65
9	HOUSTON	97	-142	58
10	PHILADELPHIA	80	-28	76
II. HIGH INTERNAL MIGRATION METROS b				
1	ATLANTA	43	192	70
2	TAMPA-ST. PETERSBURG	35	159	83
3	SEATTLE	64	146	85
4	PHOENIX	44	140	77
5	ORLANDO	35	132	77
6	LAS VEGAS	21	129	75
7	SACRAMENTO	36	118	73
8	WEST PALM BEACH	21	108	79
9	CHARLOTTE	9	67	78
10	RALEIGH-DURHAM	12	66	72
III. HIGH OUT-MIGRATION METROS c				
1	DETROIT	45	-136	75
2	PITTSBURGH	11	-90	91
3	NEW ORLEANS	10	-88	59
4	CLEVELAND	21	-80	81
5	DENVER	28	-61	80
6	OKLAHOMA CITY	12	-41	80
7	ST. LOUIS	19	-37	81
8	MILWAUKEE	13	-35	81
9	HONOLULU	41	-33	30
10	BUFFALO	11	-31	86

* 1990 Metro Residents who resided abroad in 1985

** 1985-1990 In-migrants from other States minus 1985-90 out-migrants to other States

a Metro with largest 1985-90 migration from abroad which exceeds net internal migration

b Metro with largest 1985-90 net internal migration and exceeds migration from abroad

c Metro with largest negative internal migration and not recipients of large migration from abroad

Source: Complied from 1990 Census files at the Population Studies Center, The University of Michigan

immigrants during the late 1980s. Most are old, long established metropolitan areas. It is noteworthy that seven of these register losses via internal migration outflows to the rest of the country, and for two others, (Miami and Washington, DC) internal in-migration is small. Only San Diego registers internal gains that are comparable in scope to immigration. In this respect, it is unique among major metropolitan areas, in that its growth is not dominated by one type of migration or the other.

The 10 "high internal migration" metros are, by and large, newer metropolitan areas located primarily in the nation's late 1980s high growth regions. In contrast to the high immigration metros, each of these are dominated strongly by internal migration from the rest of the country. (San Diego, which could also be included in this list, is the singular exception). It is noteworthy that three Florida metros -- Tampa-St. Petersburg, Orlando and West Palm Beach -- are among those most influenced by internal migration, while Miami is more greatly impacted by immigration from abroad. The young and elderly white migrants who move to Florida from other states are directed to different intra-state destinations than the immigrants from abroad.

Metropolitan areas affected by immigrant-dominated population change tend to have substantially larger minority population profiles than those whose gains stem from internal migration. Eight of the 10 high immigration metropolitan areas have white percentages well below the white national percentage -- including the "minority-majority" metros, Los Angeles and Miami. Among the high internal migration metros, all but two show white shares that are close to or greater than the national average. (The major exceptions are Atlanta and Raleigh-Durham, which also attract blacks through internal migration).

Finally, most of the ten metros that lost population via internal migration have large white shares (see lower panel, Table 2). These areas tend to be located in heavily white parts of the Midwest where immigration has hardly made a dent. While they are

losing people through out-migration, places like Pittsburgh, Cleveland, St. Louis, Milwaukee and Buffalo still remain predominantly white.

MAJORITY-MINORITY METRO AREA GAINERS

The separate immigration-internal migration dynamics, just reviewed, explain why the greatest minority population gains occurred in different individual metros than the greatest white population gains. This minority-majority disparity is likely to persist and intensify as a result of the concentrated nature of minority growth -- leaving many parts of the country virtually untouched or slightly sprinkled with minorities. Metro patterns of population growth and decline (resulting from both migration and natural increase) point up these differences.

Whites. Because the national white growth level was not high or infused with a significant immigration component, the redistribution of whites within the country is a "zero-sum" gain. White population gains for some metropolitan areas resulted in white population losses for others, where net out-migration exceeds natural increase. During the 1980s, 89 metro areas lost white population, led by New York where the decade-wide loss exceeded 800,000 whites. Additionally, Chicago, Pittsburgh, Detroit and Cleveland lost more than 100,000 whites. Thirty-one other metros (including Miami, Milwaukee and Boston) lost more than 10,000 whites. These losses were influenced by a variety of factors, including the delayed deindustrialization of the Rust Belt, declines in smaller Rust Belt and Oil Patch towns, as well as the immigration-induced flight that was discussed earlier.

While the remaining 191 metro areas gained whites through both migration and natural increase, the largest gains (over 100,000) were located primarily in the coastal South, Texas, and selected western states. Led by Dallas, Atlanta and Phoenix (with gains exceeding 400,000 whites), these areas included large diversified regional centers

such as Seattle and Minneapolis-St. Paul, booming South Atlantic centers (such as Charlotte, Norfolk and Raleigh-Durham), resort and retirement recreation centers in Florida (such as Tampa-St. Petersburg, Fort Myers-Cape Coral), other Sunbelt states, and a smattering of "high-tech" centers such as Austin, TX. Many of these large white gainers have only small minority populations and only a few gained more minorities than majorities over the 1980s. This profile of white losers and gainers indicates that white internal migration responded closely to the economic restructuring and period influences of the 1980s.

Hispanics. The nation's Hispanic population has grown since the late 1960s as a consequence of immigration reform, refugee movements and illegal immigration from Mexico and other Latin American nations.[27] The Hispanic population grew by more than 50 percent during the 1980s as compared with 13 percent for blacks and less than 5 percent for whites. However, because it is a diverse population, Hispanics from different origins are attracted to different parts of the country. Although Mexican-Americans can be found in all regions, they reside predominantly in the West and Southwest. Puerto Ricans are more concentrated in the Northeast, and Cubans are most prevalent in Florida.

The Hispanic population is highly concentrated in a few metro areas, and recent immigration has served to consolidate that concentration. Large Hispanic populations continue to reside in Los Angeles (4.8 million), New York (2.8 million) and Miami (1.1 million). These three areas register the greatest 1980-90 increases in their Hispanic populations. Los Angeles, alone, contains 21 percent of the nation's Hispanic population and gained over 2 million Hispanics over the decade.

This consolidation of Hispanic population gains into traditional port-of-entry metro areas is, largely, a product of immigration. While immigrants tend to locate in these traditional areas, this is not the case for internal Hispanic migrants who tend to spread outward as they assimilate.[28] This is indicated by a comparison of the

TABLE 3: List of Metropolitan Areas with Greatest Internal Migration Gains and Greatest Immigration from Abroad for Hispanics, Asians and Blacks, 1985-90

RANK — GREATEST GAINS DUE TO INTERNAL MIGRATION, 1985-90*

	Hispanics		Asians		Blacks	
	Area	Size	Area	Size	Area	Size
1.	MIAMI	48,270	LOS ANGELES	31,804	ATLANTA	74,949
2.	ORLANDO	23,701	SACRAMENTO	11,203	NORFOLK	28,909
3.	SAN DIEGO	19,711	SAN FRANCISCO	10,345	WASHINGTON	20,205
4.	LAS VEGAS	16,216	SAN DIEGO	6,355	RALEIGH-DURHRAM	17,428
5.	TAMPA-ST. PETERSBURG	13,763	BOSTON	5,364	DALLAS	16,075
6.	DALLAS	12,271	ATLANTA	4,760	ORLANDO	13,836
7.	PHOENIX	11,127	SEATTLE	3,990	RICHMOND	12,508
8.	SACRAMENTO	11,053	WASHINGTON	3,854	SAN DIEGO	12,482
9.	MODESTO	10,072	ORLANDO	3,842	MINN-ST.PAUL	11,506
10.	WASHINGTON	9,912	LAS VEGAS	3,326	SACRAMENTO	10,848

RANK — GREATEST GAINS DUE TO IMMIGRATION FROM ABROAD, 1985-90**

	Hispanics		Asians		Blacks	
	Area	Size	Area	Size	Area	Size
1.	LOS ANGELES	467,003	LOS ANGELES	219,652	NEW YORK	140,270
2.	NEW YORK	121,153	NEW YORK	190,512	MIAMI	36,228
3.	MIAMI	192,962	SAN FRANCISO	137,006	WASHINGTON	29,526
4.	SAN FRANCISCO	61,917	CHICAGO	44,823	LOS ANGELES	16,925
5.	CHICAGO	55,550	WASHINGTON	43,481	BOSTON	13,437
6.	SAN DIEGO	74,415	SAN DIEGO	31,274	PHILADELPHIA	9,446
7.	WASHINGTON	61,633	BOSTON	27,219	SAN FRANCISO	7,656
8.	HOUSTON	43,140	HONOLULU	26,869	ATLANTA	7,464
9.	BOSTON	38,770	SEATTLE	26,817	CHICAGO	6,777
10.	DALLAS	46,933	PHILADELPHIA	22,347	NORFOLK	6,537

* 1985-90 In-migrants from elsewhere in the US, minus 1985-90 out-migrants to elsewhere in the US.

** 1985-90 Immigrants from Abroad

Source: Tabulations of "Residence 5 Years Ago" Question from 1990 US. Census

destinations for Hispanic immigrants from abroad with areas that gained most from Hispanic internal migration over the 1985-90 period (see Table 3). While Miami attracts internal migrants as well as migrants from abroad, neither Los Angeles nor New York are on the list of top internal migration magnets. (In fact, both register a significant out-migration of Hispanic internal migrants.) Instead, Hispanic internal migrants gravitate to metros such as Orlando and Tampa in Florida, Las Vegas, Nevada, or Sacramento and Modesto in California -- places that are in close proximity to major immigrant destinations. These internal migration patterns contribute to a greater spread of the Hispanic population such that 29 metro areas housed at least 100,000 Hispanics in 1990, compared with only 22 in 1980. Still, the relative magnitude of these areas' net internal migration gains are small compared to those of immigration from abroad. It is these latter streams that serve to concentrate the Hispanic population into selected metro areas.

(Table 3 here)

Asians. Although Asians have settled into American cities for generations, the Asian population more than doubled during the 1980s. As a consequence, a larger share of Asians are foreign-born (66 percent) than are Hispanics (41 percent).[29] Originally, Asians came mostly from China and Japan but since the immigration statutes changed in the 1960s, significant numbers have come from the Philippines, Korea, and India. More recently, immigrants and refugees arrived from Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. The growth and diversity of Asian immigration has led to greater mixes of Asian groups in metropolitan areas. (For example, in 1990 metropolitan Washington, DC's population included more than 35,000 each of Koreans, Chinese and Indians; over 20,000 Filipinos and Vietnamese; and almost 10,000 Japanese). Also, some of the newer, smaller Asian groups follow unique settlement patterns such as the Hmongs who were resettled by local sponsors in communities in Minnesota and Wisconsin.

Yet, despite this diversity, a large immigrant component of recent Asian growth continues to concentrate the Asian population in or near traditional ports of entry. In 1990, over half the U.S. Asian population resided in Los Angeles, San Francisco and New York. These areas also accounted for the greatest 1980-90 gains of Asians. Yet, as with the Hispanic population, the internal migration of Asians does not take them to the same destinations as immigrants (see Table 3). Los Angeles leads in gains for both types of migrants, but many internal Asian migrants go to Sacramento, Atlanta, Orlando or Las Vegas -- areas which are not in the top ten list of immigrant destinations. Moreover, during the late 1980s, there was a net out-migration of Asian internal migrants from traditional immigrant metros, New York, Chicago and Honolulu.

Because Asians come from more diverse origins and are more likely to be college educated than Hispanics, they are more apt to disperse away from the traditional immigrant magnet metros as they assimilate. Already in 1990, the number of metropolitan areas with more than 100,000 Asians rose to 12, as compared with 5 in 1980. Nonetheless, the strong immigration component of Asian growth during the 1980s served to reinforce their concentration in a few select metropolitan areas. Although Asians constitute 2.8 percent of the total U.S. population, only 36 of the nation's 284 metro areas have Asian proportions as high as that.

Blacks. The black population differs from the previous two in that its redistribution occurs largely through internal migration. Yet, the black population has shown a history of regional and metropolitan distribution that differs from that of whites.[30] For most of the present century, the greatest black migrations occurred between the rural South and large industrial cities in the North, Northeast and Midwest, and then later, San Francisco and Los Angeles on the West Coast. Since 1970, blacks began to move away from the North to locate in large and small metropolitan areas in the South, as well as in other parts of the country. Until the 1980s, black migration patterns have tended to lag behind those of whites in the

movement to the suburbs as well as into the more growing regions of the country. The 1980s decade is significant for black redistribution in two ways. First, black growth is now occurring in many of the same states and metro areas as that of whites. Second, black redistribution patterns are becoming more polarized such that college graduate blacks are apt to follow mainstream migration patterns.

The evolution of black migration over the 1965-1990 period can be followed from the maps in Figure 7 which display black net internal migration patterns for states over the intervals 1965-70, 1975-80 and 1985-90. During the late 1960s, blacks were still leaving most southern states to North and West locations. California was the largest gainer, with Michigan, Maryland, New Jersey and Ohio following close behind. The greatest origins were the Deep South states of Mississippi, Alabama and Louisiana, with Arkansas and the Carolinas following close behind. By the late 1970s, the South-to-North pattern had reversed, as black migration responded to the deindustrialization-related job "shake-out". New York, Illinois and Pennsylvania shifted to strong black out-migration states. While most of the South gained black migrants, California still remained the greatest black destination.

(Figure 7 about here)

The northern exodus continued through the late 1980s. However, now California is no longer the top black migrant destination. Its black gains of the 1970s were reduced by one-third, and Georgia moved up to be the top black gainer. It was during this period that black internal movement, like that of whites, shifted to the growing South Atlantic region. Maryland, Florida, Virginia and North Carolina followed Georgia as the top black migrant receiving states. Each of these (except Maryland) more than doubled their black migration gains of the 1975-80 period. Texas is no longer among the top ten black magnet states -- falling behind Nevada and Arizona in the West, Tennessee in the Southeast and Minnesota -- the greatest northern black gaining state in the late 1980s.



Figure 7: Net Migration of Black PopulationFor 3 Periods

Even greater similarities to recent white migration patterns are seen with black metropolitan area net migration gains. Again, for the 1985-90, blacks drawn to the South Atlantic regions selected Atlanta, Washington, DC, Norfolk, and Raleigh-Durham, as well as a host of smaller areas and non-metropolitan communities. Among twenty-one metropolitan areas of all sizes that gained more than 5,000 black net migrants, 15 are located in the South Atlantic region. Black, like whites, were attracted to the dynamic economies of this region's larger metropolitan areas, as well as to its growing manufacturing communities, university towns and coastal retirements areas. Also important is the continued lure of friends and family kinship networks for black return migrants from the North. While South Atlantic metro areas dominated as black migrant destinations, Dallas and San Diego also received large numbers. Increased black migration also occurred to Sacramento, Las Vegas and Phoenix in West and Minneapolis-St. Paul in the North -- again, consistent with 1980s white patterns.

The two metropolitan areas which still house the largest black populations in the country -- New York and Chicago -- together accounted for a quarter-million net migration loss of blacks over the 1985-90 period. New to the 1980s were migration losses for the two historic West Coast black metro destinations -- Los Angeles and San Francisco. These 1980s trends, more consistent with white shifts, do not reinforce earlier black distribution trends. Still, more so than whites, blacks were prone to select southern metro destinations and those with significant existing black communities.

D. GEOGRAPHIC SHIFTS BY POVERTY AND SKILL-LEVEL

The previous section showed how post-1980 redistribution across regions and metro areas became segmented by race and ethnicity. The present section addresses the question: Has redistribution also become segmented on measures of socioeconomic status? Two such measures, education attainment and poverty status, will be evaluated. Both are related to migration decision making.[31] As a proxy for skill-level,

education distinguishes between college graduates -- who are more likely to move long distances in response to "pushes" and "pulls" of a nation-wide labor market, and those with lesser educations. Persons in poverty often are less mobile than other population segments and their destinations are often influenced by the availability of friends and family.

There are reasons why redistribution became segmented across the status dimensions of education attainment and poverty status. The widening disparities in earnings potential available to college-degreed persons, compared with lesser educated persons occurred at the same time that regional industrial restructuring trends created greater spatial separation between the locations of "knowledge-based" employment opportunities and those that required lesser skills.[32] Poverty populations became more entrenched in certain rural parts of the country and in select metropolitan areas. Moreover, the higher poverty levels of some race and ethnic groups, which remain concentrated in specific regions, heighten the poverty levels of those regions. These regional concentrations of poverty became further maintained by the focused destinations of poor immigrants from abroad. At the same time, the internal migration patterns of the poverty population have served to diffuse these poverty concentrations, to some extent.

The discussion below addresses three broad questions. Just how segmented are post-1980 redistribution patterns on the dimensions of education attainment and poverty status? To what extent do race and ethnic distributions account for these patterns? And what roles do selective immigration and internal migration play in the process?

METRO AREAS

Metro areas that show large gains or declines in the total population might be expected to show these patterns, as well, for different population subgroups --

particularly if they are large, diverse metropolises. However, this is not the case. Distinct distribution patterns for poverty viz. non-poverty, and college graduates viz. not college graduates population segments, show that different individual metro areas may gain or lose population for these segments -- in some cases, as a consequence of their racial compositions.

The upper portion of Table 4 contrasts the largest individual metro areas gaining in poverty with those gaining in non-poverty populations over the 1980-90 decade. These gains include changes that result from migration in addition to poverty gains among the resident population. It is noteworthy that only eight metro areas appear on both "top 15" lists and that only two -- Los Angeles and Dallas -- appear among the "top 6" on each. Metros gaining large poverty populations tend to be those with a large Hispanic presence, as well as "port-of-entry" areas for recent immigrants. They include smaller-sized border areas such as McAllen and El Paso, Texas as well as northern manufacturing areas with large numbers of poverty blacks (Detroit, Milwaukee). The metros gaining most in non-poverty population represent a broader geographic spread, including national and regional financial centers (San Francisco, Atlanta), government centers (Washington, D.C.), as well as resort and retirement areas (Tampa-St. Petersburg, Orlando).

(Table 4 here)

Turning to educational attainment, the lower portion of Table 4 contrasts metro areas with greatest 1980-90 gains in college graduates with metro areas that gained most of the lesser-educated population. Although there is an overlap of areas on both lists (9 of 15 areas), this overlap occurs primarily with South and West region metro areas (New York is the lone northern region exception). The remaining areas, among top college graduate gainers, are all in the northern regions whereas the remaining "less than college graduate" gaining areas are all in the Sunbelt. A good part of the attraction for college graduates is attributable to the industrial structures of the particular metro

Table 4: Metro Areas with Greatest 1980-90 Population Increases by Poverty and Education Attainment Status

Growth Rank	1980-90 Increase (1,000s)	Metro Areas	Growth Rank	1980-90 Increase (1,000s)	Metro Areas
Poverty Population			**Non-Poverty Population**		
1.	529	Los Angeles	1.	2419	Los Angeles
2.	233	Houston	2.	810	San Francisco-Oakland
3.	162	Dallas-Fort Worth	3.	778	Dallas-Fort Worth
4.	134	Miami	4.	664	Atlanta
5.	116	Detroit	5.	659	Washington, D.C.
6.	101	Phoenix	6.	623	New York
7.	73	San Diego	7.	561	San Diego
8.	67	Fresno	8.	500	Phoenix
9.	60	McAllen-TX	9.	420	Seattle
10.	60	San Antonio	10.	396	Miami
11.	57	Milwaukee	11.	394	Tampa-St. Petersburg
12.	54	Minneapolis-St. Paul	12.	362	Houston
13.	54	El Paso-TX	13.	340	Orlando
14.	52	Pittsburgh	14.	318	Sacramento
15.	51	Sacramento	15.	273	Minneapolis-St. Paul
College Graduates			**Less than College Graduate**		
1.	996	New York	1.	1482	Los Angeles
2.	727	Los Angeles	2.	457	Dallas-Fort Worth
3.	460	San Francisco-Oakland	3.	392	San Francisco-Oakland
4.	385	Chicago	4.	358	Houston
5.	370	Washington, D.C.	5.	328	Atlanta
6.	301	Boston	6.	327	Phoenix
7.	298	Philadelphia	7.	315	San Diego
8.	282	Dallas-Fort Worth	8.	302	Miami
9.	232	Atlanta	9.	279	Tampa-St. Petersburg
10.	178	Seattle	10.	259	Washington, D.C.
11.	174	Houston	11.	243	Seattle
12.	170	San Diego	12.	204	New York
13.	158	Minneapolis-St. Paul	13.	196	Sacramento
14.	153	Detroit	14.	195	Orlando
15.	140	Baltimore	15.	182	Las Vegas

*Abbreviated names

areas listed in Table 4. These include large corporate and "advanced service" centers at both the national and regional levels with occupation structures heavily weighted toward professionals and managers. Alternatively, several of the Sunbelt areas on the list of "less than college graduate" gainers are retirement centers, consumer service centers, and areas that have attracted large numbers of immigrants.

POVERTY, EDUCATION AND MINORITY SHIFTS

Are the 1980s distribution disparities by poverty and skill-level related to these areas' racial compositions? Several race-specific analyses (not shown) indicate that the answer is generally "no" -- at least for whites and blacks.[33] That is, when focusing on poverty status, there exist significant geographic growth disparities between the poverty and non-poverty populations within the white and black racial groups. In contrast, the geographic differences between the Hispanic poverty and non-poverty growth patterns are not substantial. Hence, more so than for whites or blacks, Hispanic gains tend to be associated with poverty gains. Asian average poverty levels are much lower than Hispanic levels, so that Asian population gains are not generally linked to large poverty increases.

IMMIGRATION-INTERNAL MIGRATION DYNAMICS

Poverty, Immigration and "Flight" New, high levels of immigration during the 1980s helped to shape the dynamics of poverty population gains and losses. This is suggested in the results above, which showed metro areas with greatest poverty gains to exhibit increases in Hispanic populations. While poverty populations have grown sharply in several large immigrant "port-of-entry" states and metro areas, internal migrants who are below the poverty line are being pushed to other parts of the country. Many of these same areas, which house "dual economies," are attracting college-educated internal migrants at the same time that they are losing poverty migrants via internal migration. Together, these immigration-internal migration dynamics suggest that the

minority gains and white population losses observed for high immigration metropolitan areas (in Section C) will be most pronounced at the lower end of the socio-economic status spectrum.[34]

The impact of immigration for poverty population change was most evident in the Los Angeles metropolitan area. Over the 1985-90 period, Los Angeles attracted 207,000 poverty migrants from all migration sources.[34] This represents the sum of 282,000 poverty immigrants from abroad and the net out-migration of 75,000 poverty internal migrants to other parts of the U.S. Among the abroad immigrants, the majority were Hispanics. Of all states, California represents, by far, the state with the largest poverty gains from all migration sources. Florida (with 180,000) is second, and New York and Texas (65,000 and 62,000) come next. An additional eight states gained between 30,000 and 62,000 migrants from all sources.

The strong impact of immigration from abroad on the poverty migration influx to California also typifies the poverty gains for New York and Texas. All three states received all of their poverty migration gains through immigration because they registered net losses of internal poverty migrants in their exchanges with other states. In contrast, Florida's poverty gains were more equally divided between immigrants from abroad and internal in-migrants from other states. This is also the case for Washington and Arizona, which rank fifth and sixth, respectively, in total poverty migration gains from all sources in the late 1980s.

The late 1980s migration data show a fairly consistent pattern where states and metro areas, that receive large flows of poverty immigrants from abroad, tend to lose their existing poverty migrants through internal migration to other states. Of the ten largest immigration metro areas over the 1985-90 period (shown in Table 2) eight lost internal poverty migrants to other parts of the country. In fact, led by the New York metro area (with -166,000), five of these areas had the greatest out-flows of poverty persons, through internal migration, among all metro areas. These patterns suggest

that the impact of immigration for these port-of-entry areas exerts the greatest strains on the economic prospects for the less-well off segments of the native-born population.

At the same time, many of these metro areas continue to attract college graduate migrants through internal migration from other states. For example, the Los Angeles metropolitan area gained 59,000 college graduates over the same period that it lost poverty migrants through internal migration. Seven of the ten highest immigrant-attracting metros also gained college graduates that were internal migrants. These high immigration metro areas that both pull college graduates and push poverty migrants in their exchanges with other states have diversified, "dual economies" that continue to create employment opportunities in professional and high-skilled jobs.[36]

"Segmented" Migration by Poverty, Skill-level and Race. Even aside from these patterns for high immigration areas, the "pushes" and "pulls" of internal migration streams differ across status dimensions. This is indicated on the maps in Figure 8 which contrasts late 1980s internal migration patterns for college graduates and the poverty population. College graduate destinations are much more focused toward the growing South Atlantic and West Coast states, which have economically revived in the late 1980s. Poverty migration patterns are much more diffuse -- spreading over a broader swath of states. Also poverty internal migrants are moving away from the high immigration states -- particularly New York, Illinois, Texas, New Jersey and California. The latter out-migration reflects the "push" of competition with immigrants to these states for low-end jobs, rather than the more focused "pulls" for college graduate migrants.[37] The internal migration data for individual metropolitan areas (not shown) reveal similar disparities. Several metropolitan areas -- such as Los Angeles, Washington, D.C. and San Francisco -- which registered highest college graduate gains via internal migration, were among the top "senders" of poverty migrants to other parts of the country.



College Graduates



Poverty Population

Net In-Migration

5 Top Gaining

Other Gaining

Net Out-Migration

5 Top Losing

Other Losing

Figure 8: 1985-1990 Net Migration For College Graduates and Poverty Populations

(Figure 8 here)

Migration differences by socioeconomic status are evident within both the white and black populations. White internal migration patterns by education attainment and poverty status are similar to those for the total population, shown in Figure 8. While black patterns do not exactly follow those of whites, the states and metro areas that attract black poverty migrants are, largely, different than those that attract black college graduates. During the late 1980s, black poverty net migration was most strongly directed to smaller nonmetropolitan communities in the South Atlantic states and to selected areas of the Midwest. Internal migration to familiar family and friends' locations has accounted for much of this movement. In contrast, major destinations for black college graduate migrants included large cosmopolitan areas, both inside the South (Atlanta, Washington, DC, Dallas, Miami) and out (Los Angeles, San Francisco) as well as the growing recreation center of Orlando. Of the ten top metro magnets for black poverty and college graduate internal migrants, only Atlanta and Raleigh-Durham appear on both lists. There is, in fact, a greater overlap in the destinations of black college graduates with white college graduates. The states of Georgia, California, Florida and Virginia are among the top six destination states for both white and black college graduates during the late 1980s.[38]

The preceding discussion makes plain that the status-segmented redistribution of the 1980s was effected by both selective immigration and internal migration patterns. Most heavily impacted were the high immigration areas introduced in the earlier (Section C) discussion of minority and white redistribution, where it appears that the greatest racial turnover will be at the lower end of the socio-economic spectrum. Within high immigration areas, it is the minority-dominant poverty immigrant stream that exerts an economic "push" on low- and middle-income native-born out-migrants. Because the latter migrants are largely white, these dynamics will lead to a new race and socio-economic status structure in these areas where lower income, less educated

segments of the population most likely to be of "majority minorities." This impact has already been felt in California where the 1990 census shows a minority of whites in the following population segments: under age 25; less than high school educations; incomes below twice the poverty income; and male workers in service, farming, operator and laborer occupations. These categories have been most strongly impacted by 1985-90 minority-dominated immigration from abroad and white-dominated internal out-migration from the state.[39]

E. SPATIAL GENERATION GAPS -- ADULT BOOMERS AND THE ELDERLY

Just as population shifts across the nation's areas have become segmented by race, ethnicity, and social status, they are also becoming segmented by age. Historically, migration has been more frequent among young adults in their early labor force years. Not only are their mobility levels greater than those of older adults, but they tend to be more sharply directed to areas with growing employment opportunities. Middle-aged workers, approaching their forties, do not move nearly as frequently. While the economics of the labor market also plays a large role in their migration patterns, personal preferences, amenities and family ties also come into play. Finally, the retired elderly population migrates at low rates, but to selected destinations. For them, employment opportunities are far less important than quality of life, climate, amenities and proximity to relatives. Yet elderly distribution shifts are not only affected by selective migration, but also by the "aging-in-place" of newly-retired cohorts.[40]

Because of their different motivations, the geographic redistribution patterns of these three age groups differ from each other. During the 1980s, the young adult population (aged 25-34 in 1990) was roughly synonymous with the late baby boom cohorts -- born 1955-64. Although well-educated, these large cohorts encountered strained entry-level job opportunities during the 1980s, and their migration patterns

were strongly driven by the decade's large metro, bi-coastal growth patterns. During the same decade, the early baby boom cohorts, born before 1955, entered into middle age. Although more settled, some of these older boomers were pushed by the economic downturns in the interior parts of the country, and drawn to both fast-growing regions and some high amenity areas. Lastly, the elderly population continued to swell during the 1980s due to the retirement of large early-century birth cohorts. Their movement patterns were directed southward, even more sharply than those of the two baby boomer groups.

The discussion that follows will contrast the geographic migration patterns of these three groups during a decade when the inflated baby boom cohorts occupied the prime labor force migration ages and when the ranks of the elderly were swelled by large numbers of retirees. It was also a decade when the growth and declines of employment opportunities were separated by the sharp spatial divides discussed above. After these comparisons of age-group migration patterns, a further discussion of broader elderly growth and decline patterns will ensue.

MIGRATION OF YOUNGER BOOMERS

There was a question as to whether younger boomers would be directed to destinations, like Washington, DC, San Francisco and Atlanta--celebrated for attracting same-aged "gentrifiers" and "yuppies" back in the 1970s. While these generally well-educated, younger boomers shared some of the career aspirations and wanderlust that characterized the older boomers when they were young adults a decade earlier, these late boomers are also more practical.[41] Having lived through and watched what the mid-1970s economy did to many older boomers' employment prospects -- relegating many to reside in small Southwest towns rather than Nob Hill or Georgetown -- and adjusting to the higher 1980s housing costs, the late baby boomers were less attracted to the bright lights of glamour cities than to growing areas with more moderate living

TABLE 5: List of Metropolitan Areas with Greatest Internal Migration Gains and Losses for Baby Boomers and the Elderly, 1985-90

RANK GREATEST GAINS DUE TO INTERNAL MIGRATION, 1985-90*

	Young Baby Boomers **		Old Baby Boomers***		Elderly****	
	Area	Size	Area	Size	Area	Size
1.	ATLANTA	84,340	ATLANTA.	36,151	TAMPA-ST. PETE	33,580
2.	SEATTLE	57,971	SEATTLE	27,202	WEST PALM BEACH	27,669
3.	WASHINGTON DC	52,476	TAMPA-ST. PETE	23,166	PHOENIX	20,966
4.	ORLANDO	34,558	ORLANDO	22,816	LAS VEGAS	14,180
5.	MINN.-ST.PAUL	33,742	SACRAMENTO	21,286	FORT PIERCE,FL	11,362
6	SACRAMENTO	29,446	LAS VEGAS	20,528	FORT MYERS, FL	11,348
7	LAS VEGAS	28,518	PHOENIX	19,684	MIAMI	11,070
8	DALLAS	26,491	WEST PALM BEACH	14,770	LAKELAND, FL	10,569
9.	CHARLOTTE	25,799	PORTLAND,OR	13,515	SAN DIEGO	10,171
10.	PORTLAND, OR	25,700	SAN DIEGO	11,782	DAYTONA BEACH	9,731

RANK GREATEST LOSSES DUE TO INTERNAL MIGRATION, 1985-90

	Young Baby Boomers		Old Baby Boomers		Elderly	
	Area	Size	Area	Size	Area	Size
1.	NEW YORK	-156,407	NEW YORK	-155,157	NEW YORK	-156,360
2.	BOSTON	-25,319	CHICAGO	-37,524	LOS ANGELES	-51,949
3.	NEW ORLEANS	-22,401	HOUSTON	-33,123	CHICAGO	-42,981
4.	OKLAHOMA CITY	-19,455	LOS ANGELES	-31,108	DETROIT	-22,759
5.	AUSTIN	-19,002	BOSTON	-28,100	SAN FRANCISCO	-21,883
6.	PITTSBURGH	-18,491	SAN FRANCISCO	-24,605	BOSTON	-17,132
7.	HONOLULU	-17,069	DENVER	-17,650	WASHINGTON DC	-12,977
8.	HOUSTON	-16,903	NEW ORLEANS	-17,056	PHILADELPHIA	-12,327
9.	PROVO,UT	-14,162	DETROIT	-12,533	CLEVELAND	-9,097
10.	BRYAN-COLLEGE STATION	-14,064	PITTSBURGH	-10,951	PITTSBURGH	-8,103

* 1985-90 In-migrants from elsewhere in the US, minus 1985-90 out-migrants to elsewhere in the US.

** Born between 1956-65 (Ages 25-34 in 1990)

*** Born Between 1946-55 (Ages 35-44 in 1990)

**** Ages 65 and older in 1990

Source: Tabulations of "Residence 5 Years Ago" Question from 1990 US. Census

costs.[42] This is evident from the list of metro areas that attracted most young boomer internal migrants in the late 1980s. (See Table 5).

Although Washington, DC still appears among the top gainers for late boomers, most of the areas attracting these young adults are in the growing South Atlantic and Pacific or Mountain regions. Not long-time centers of culture or the arts, many are upstart growth centers, such as Orlando, Las Vegas and Charlotte, or metros like Sacramento and Portland, Oregon which have not, historically, dominated their regions. "Interior" metros, Minneapolis-St. Paul and Dallas are also on the list. Their strong, diversified economic bases set them apart from their immediate regional contexts. The traditional California young adult "magnets" -- San Francisco and Los Angeles -- still gained these young migrants in the 1980s. However, San Francisco now ranks 14th -- behind Phoenix and Baltimore; and Los Angeles ranks 18th -- behind West Palm Beach, Nashville, and Kansas City. Declining employment prospects and increased living costs in these areas made them far less attractive destinations.

(Table 5 here)

The areas which lost most young boomers due to internal migration do not closely overlap with those for the general population (compare Table 5 with Table 2). Large numbers of boomers, like the general population, migrated away from New York, and areas such as New Orleans, Pittsburgh and Houston which experienced economic downturns during the 1980s. However, many boomers also left Honolulu and places with large college populations, such as Boston, Austin, Oklahoma City, Provo, Utah, and Bryan College Station, Texas. Young boomers were also moving away from non-metropolitan communities in the same parts of the country that attracted large numbers of young adults in the recession-ridden 1970s. Between 1985-90, non-metropolitan areas in the South and West regions of the country experienced a net out-migration of young-adult baby boomers.

MIGRATION OF OLDER BOOMERS

The early baby boomers, roughly born between 1946 and 1955, entered their late thirties and forties over the 1980-90 decade. Back in the 1970s, as young adults, their redistribution patterns were heavily shaped by the de-industrialization-related employment declines in the industrialized Northeast and Midwest. Aside from the growth in large urban "yuppie meccas", the northern job shake-out served to direct their migration to the South and West, as well as to smaller and non-metropolitan communities.[43] During the 1980s, the continued downsizing in manufacturing and, later, service employment served to exert further "pushes" from selected northern areas. At the same time, energy and resource-based declines in interior areas, and immigration-related competition from port-of-entry areas broadened the geography of places that served as origins for the out-migration of these now, older boomers.

The bottom panel of Table 5 shows that the greatest origins for their out-migration included northern metros (New York, Chicago, Boston, Detroit, Pittsburgh), interior metros (Houston, Denver, and New Orleans) and western port-of-entry metros (Los Angeles and San Francisco). Since several of these large metros (especially Los Angeles, San Francisco and Denver) constituted popular large urban magnets for baby boomers back in the 1970s, it is clear that the geography of opportunities has changed sharply as these cohorts entered middle age.

The major gaining metros for older baby boomers show some overlap with those that attracted younger boomers. Atlanta, Seattle, Orlando, Sacramento and Las Vegas -- all in growing regions -- were among the top magnets for both groups of boomers. Older boomers, however, were more prone than younger boomers to locate in warmer metros which also attract large numbers of retirees. Some of this movement may reflect preferences as well as economics among the more well-off middle aged population. Among the 50 states, Florida represents the overwhelming destination for 35-44 year-old migrants. It attracted over 150,000 older boomers in the late 1980s -- placing well



Young Baby Boomers



Old Baby Boomers



Elderly

Net In-Migration

- 5 Top Gaining
- Other Gaining

Net Out-Migration

- 5 Top Losing
- Other Losing

Figure 9: 1985-1990 Net Migration For Young Baby Boomers, Old Baby Boomers and Elderly Populations.

ahead of Georgia, which attracted about 50,000, and the state of Washington, which attracted 42,000.

(Figure 9 here)

THE MOBILE ELDERLY

Because elderly migrants are more strongly attracted to warm weather, good amenities, and the availability of social services, it is not surprising that metro areas in Florida dominate the list of elderly migration magnets during the late 1980s. Tampa-St. Petersburg and West Palm Beach, together, gained more that 60,000 elderly migrants than they lost over the 1985-90 period.[44] In fact, the state of Florida gained over 200,000 elderly net migrants during the late 1980s -- 5 times the gain to Arizona, the second ranking state (at 40,000); and more than 9 times that of North Carolina, which ranked third (at 17,000). Still, elderly net migration gains are spread along a broad swath of Sunbelt states and high-amenity states in the Pacific and Mountain West. (See Figure 8). Phoenix and Las Vegas are two large elderly magnets in this part of the country.

Just as the Sunbelt represents a strong attraction for elderly migrants, the Snowbelt lends a strong push. Net out-migration of the elderly population during the late 1980s was heavily concentrated among the states and metropolitan areas in the Midwest, Northeast and Eastern Seaboard. The motivation here has less to do with de-industrialization or employment decline, than with the severe winters and the high costs of living in these regions. New York, Chicago and Detroit are large northern contributors to the elderly migration South.

What is most surprising among areas losing elderly population through internal migration is the high magnitude of losses for Los Angeles and San Francisco metro areas, which contribute to a significant elderly net out-migration for the state of California as a whole. The strong 1980s push from this, once, elderly magnet state has

less to do with its temperature or climate than with high housing costs and crowding. Elderly residents who owned homes are able to trade in their equity for more tranquil environments at lower costs, in other amenity-laden states.[31] In fact, the high elderly out-migration from California is largely responsible for recent gains in the neighboring states of Oregon, Nevada, and Arizona. California excepted, elderly migration is a Snowbelt to Sunbelt phenomenon and stands in contrast to the interior -- bi-coastal migration shifts followed by the two working-aged baby boomer groups.[45]

ELDERLY GROWTH AND "AGING" AREAS

Aging-In-Place and Migration. The above discussion of elderly migration patterns touches on just one important component of elderly growth over the 1980s. This is because an area's elderly population can also grow from aging-in-place. Aging-in-place refers to elderly growth that results from people under age 65 growing older without moving. Areas with relatively large 60-64 year-old populations will increase their elderly populations via this component, assuming that this group does not migrate out of the area as they reach their retirement years. Aging-in-place was a particularly important component of elderly growth during the 1980s because the large birth cohorts of the years 1916-1925 were poised to increase the elderly population in most parts of the country. As a result, the nation's elderly population grew by 22 percent over the decade, even though the total population (of all ages) grew by just under 10 percent. Most states, metropolitan areas and counties in the United States increased their elderly population during the decade even if they lost some of their elderly population through net out-migration.

Of course, the amenity-laden Florida retirement center metros increased their populations, primarily, through in-migration. But for a larger number of metropolitan areas, the aging-in-place component was most important. These areas were located in parts of the country that have prospered economically in recent decades and, as a

result, have built up sizeable working-aged populations who are now beginning to enter their elderly years. Such areas tend to be located in the coastal South and West. Even California, which experienced late-1980s losses in their elderly populations via migration (discussed above), increased its elderly population, overall, as a result of aging-in-place. (The state's -35,000 net migration loss of elderly during the 1985-90 period is well overshadowed by an estimated 864,000 gain attributable to aging-in-place).[46]

Areas that increased their elderly populations rapidly, due to selective in-migration, tended to select the most affluent, "younger" retired elderly. Even areas with fast-growing, aging-in-place populations gain on these "positive" elderly demographic characteristics, since such areas attracted large numbers of these more economically desirable migrants during their working-aged years. This segment of the elderly population is typically in good health, is comprised of largely husband-wife households, and possesses sufficient disposable income to benefit the local economies

The older, less mobile segment of the elderly population is more often beset by health problems, and is disproportionately made up of widows who survive their male spouses. It is more dominant in areas that the younger elderly have moved away from. If these households do move, it is typically to be near relatives or other long-term friends who can supply social and financial support. Such moves are often "return" moves away from the high-amenity areas that attract the young elderly population.[47]

Areas with slow-growing or negative-growing elderly populations are, then, neither attracting large numbers of young elderly migrants, nor benefitting from aging-in-place elderly growth. These areas, typically, have histories of economic decline and have not attracted large numbers of working-aged populations. As a consequence, social support services for their elderly populations are not plentiful. This adds a further push to the out-migration of their young elderly populations, as well. Such areas are concentrated in the nation's interior -- in states of the Rustbelt, the Farmbelt

and Oil Patch regions. This situation also characterizes a large number of economically depressed non-metropolitan counties which contrast sharply with those rural and exurban retirement counties that have continued to attract elderly migrants during the 1980s.[48]

Elderly Concentration. Apart from the growth or decline of the elderly population, an area's elderly concentration (percent of the total population which is aged 65 and above) is an index of the elderly population's impact on the area's social service requirements, tax base, and even political orientation. While 12.6 percent of the country's population is elderly, elderly concentration varies across individual metropolitan areas ranging from 4 percent in Anchorage, Alaska to 32 percent in Sarasota, Florida.

It is important to distinguish between the two primary ways that a high elderly concentration can come about. The first occurs in largely retirement communities where the elderly population grows faster than the non-elderly population, as a consequence of selective elderly in-migration. In other kinds of areas, elderly concentration arises not because of higher elderly growth levels -- but because of the slow growth or decline of the non-elderly population who out-migrate.

The first type of elderly concentration is seen in a much more positive light than the second. Because of the migration selectivity associated with young retirees, retirement communities tend to attract younger elderly with positive socio-demographic characteristics who contribute to economic growth in their destination areas -- including job creation in the service and health care sectors. The second type of elderly concentration occurs in economically depressed areas, where the younger population moves out, leaving behind a non-mobile aging elderly population with less select socio-demographic characteristics. At the extreme, such areas are saddled with large

dependent elderly populations that become reliant on declining economies and tax bases for their social and medical services.[49]

While both kinds of elderly concentrations increased over the 1980s, most of the high elderly concentration areas are of the latter type. Metropolitan areas that rank on the very top of the list of elderly concentration tend to be the resort and retirement areas located, mostly, in Florida. Sarasota, Bradenton, and Ft. Myers, Florida metropolitan areas each house 1990 populations that are more than one-quarter elderly -- and an additional six Florida metros have elderly concentrations that are greater than 20 percent. Yet, the next highest echelon of elderly concentrated areas include such metros as Pittsburgh, Johnstown and Altoona, Pennsylvania, Wheeling, West Virginia; and Duluth, Minnesota. In fact, the upper third of all metropolitan areas, when ranked on elderly concentration, are more often located in the slow-growing northern and interior parts of the country than in the retirement centers of Florida, Arizona and the Mountain West.[50]

In contrast to the 1970s, elderly and non-elderly growth patterns tended to diverge in the 1980s.[51] Overall nonelderly 1980s population gains accrued to metro areas in the coastal South and parts of the West -- driven by economic "pulls" affecting labor force-aged migration. In contrast, elderly population shifts were slower paced, less driven by migration (compared to aging-in-place), and continued to filter to smaller metro and non-metro communities in selected parts of the Sunbelt. As a consequence, northern areas continued to lose their labor force-aged populations at a greater rate than their elderly populations--and within the Sunbelt, non-elderly growth focused on larger areas, while elderly growth was directed to smaller ones. (This latter pattern, in particular, contrasted with the 1970s when both elderly and nonelderly segments of the population helped to fuel the so-called "rural renaissance".)[52]

Therefore, especially during the 1980s, the rise in elderly concentration was shaped by the selective out-migration of the non-elderly population -- rather than the

growth of the elderly population.[53] Areas that encountered the most dramatic elderly concentration increases included northern interior areas of all sizes -- such as Cleveland, Peoria and Dubuque -- and smaller-sized Sunbelt areas, such as Beaumont in Texas and Great Falls in Montana. On the other hand, the urban-directed redistribution of the non-elderly population served to reduce the elderly concentration in many large Sunbelt magnets.[54] This was the case in the metro areas of Orlando, Dallas, Atlanta and Tampa, for example. While many of these areas also gained elderly migrants, their even stronger draw for working-aged migrants and immigrants from abroad reduced their level of elderly concentration.

The increased elderly concentration levels during the 1980s were certainly aided by the magnitude of the large national aging-in-place population. The "graduation" of the large not-yet-elderly cohorts into the 65-and-older category helped to inflate the retirement migration streams to elderly magnet areas in Florida and in other parts of the Sunbelt. It also accelerated elderly concentration in many areas, that did not attract these older migrants, through local aging-in-place. Yet, the sharp diversity in elderly concentration patterns that has emerged across regions, metropolitan areas and non-metropolitan counties was also shaped, to a large degree, by migration patterns of the non-elderly population. This has created a myriad of local problems for areas which have borne the brunt of this selective working-aged out-migration, and they will only persist as their existing elderly populations continue to age.

F. WITHIN-METRO AREAS: THE SUBURBS DOMINATE

With this section, the focus turns to population shifts within the metropolitan area, with particular emphasis on central city-suburb contrasts.[55] The population dynamics between central cities and their suburbs have changed considerably since the "Leave it to Beaver" 1950s. Back then, the suburbs were primarily bedroom

communities, while most of the metropolitan area's business, shopping and entertainment took place within the confines of the central cities. During the 1950s and 1960s, suburbanization exploded to such an extent that the 1970 suburban population exceeded the central city population for the nation as a whole. During the 1980s, as with the 1970s, the country's suburban population grew at a much slower pace than during the immediate post-war years. This is partly due to the circumstance that most of the metropolitan population already lived in the broad expanse of territory that most studies consider to be "the suburbs".

Yet, this conventional definition of suburbia -- the entire territory of the metropolitan area beyond the statistically designated central city -- includes land uses, housing and population characteristics that neither Wally nor "The Beaver" would recognize as suburban. The broad territory surrounding major central cities has become a patchwork that includes inner suburbs, large suburban cities, office parks, retail centers, and even low density, rural territory -- in addition to the stereotypic bedroom communities. Although most of the city-suburb analysis that follows will conform to the conventional "central city versus rest-of-metro" definition, it will also discuss how the broad expanse of today's suburbs have become so heterogeneous. The present section will be followed by two additional sections that pertain to within-metropolitan redistribution as it is linked to socioeconomic status (Section G), and race and ethnicity (Section H).

MODEST CITY REBOUNDS

Just as metropolitan area growth dynamics vary widely across a country, so do growth and decline patterns of central cities and their surrounding suburbs. Because of their longer histories and greater opportunities for suburban spread, older central cities tend to comprise a smaller portion of the metropolitan populations.[56] They are at later stages of suburbanization and are more prone to show population declines or

Table 6: Percent Change in Central City(s) and Suburbs of 25 Large Metropolitan Areas and for Region, Metropolitan Categories 1960-1990

Region & Metropolitan Area*	1990 Metro Size (1000's)	1990 Percent in City	Central City Percent 10-Yr. Change 1960-1970	Central City 1970-1980	Central City 1980-1990	Suburbs Percent 10-Yr. Change 1960-1970	Suburbs 1970-1980	Suburbs 1980-1990
NORTHEAST								
New York	8747	84	1	-10	4	22	2	2
Philadelphia	4857	35	-3	-14	-6	25	6	8
Boston	3784	33	2	-7	3	16	2	4
Pittsburgh	2057	19	-14	-18	-13	4	-1	-6
MIDWEST								
Chicago	6070	48	-5	-11	-7	40	13	7
Detroit	4382	28	-8	-19	-13	31	10	2
Cleveland	1831	28	-14	-24	-12	27	1	0
Minneapolis-St. Paul	2464	30	-2	-12	1	51	22	23
St. Louis	2444	25	-11	-22	-9	31	9	7
Cincinnati	1453	25	-10	-15	-6	22	9	7
Milwaukee	1432	48	-2	-9	0	27	10	5
Kansas City	1566	44	20	-7	1	8	17	17
SOUTH								
Washington, DC	3924	21	1	-14	0	65	17	28
Dallas	2553	48	31	8	16	56	56	48
Houston	3302	51	34	27	3	53	83	48
Miami	1937	33	24	12	9	45	40	25
Atlanta	2834	15	2	-13	-4	58	45	42
Baltimore	2382	32	-3	-12	-6	35	20	17
Tampa-St. Petersburg	2068	30	12	9	4	69	82	43
WEST								
Los Angeles	8863	48	12	5	18	22	8	19
San Francisco	1604	45	-3	-5	7	30	6	9
Seattle	1973	31	-1	-5	8	64	26	31
San Diego	2498	49	28	28	30	36	48	39
Phoenix	2122	73	67	44	36	-5	104	56
Denver	1623	29	4	-4	-5	62	58	23
REGION TOTALS								
Northeast	45886	37	10	-1	3	21	6	5
Midwest	42421	41	13	3	3	23	14	6
South	60342	41	22	22	17	21	38	25
West	44658	42	28	23	24	30	29	25
U.S. TOTALS								
Large Metropolitan	111187	40	18	8	12	31	18	17
Medium Metropolitan	59605	39	16	14	12	16	23	14
Small Metropolitan	22515	47	13	15	8	6	24	8
TOTAL	193307	40	17	11	12	23	20	15

*Metropolitan areas, central cities and suburbs are based on MSA, PMSA and NECMA definitions as designated on June 30, 1990. Names are abbreviated

Large Metropolitan areas have 1990 populations exceeding one million; Medium Metropolitan areas have 1990 populations exceeding 250,000.

smaller growth than younger cities. Since central city declines are exacerbated when the entire metropolitan area is undergoing an economic downturn, it is not surprising that all large central cities in the older Northeast and Midwest regions lost population back in the 1970s. (See Table 6). Most large cities in these regions lost at least 10 percent of their population and three hard-hit areas -- Detroit, Cleveland and St. Louis -- lost roughly one-fifth of their population during this period.

(Table 6 here)

With this backdrop, the 1980s brought a rebound of population growth for many of these larger central cities. In some cases, this was simply due to the fact that the entire metropolitan area also rebounded, economically, over the period. Still, industrial structures in certain kinds of metropolitan areas tend to favor the central city. This is typically the case in advanced service cities which are home to corporate headquarters, financial institutions, medical centers and like activities that favor central locations within the metropolitan area. Therefore, the 1980s rebound for these kinds of activities served to favor places like New York, Boston, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Atlanta and Dallas.

Yet, even these central cities, which hold niches as corporate, finance or information centers, do not dominate their metropolitan area -- either economically or demographically -- in the way they once had. This is especially true for large metropolitan areas in the older regions of the country. For example, Philadelphia's central city population accounted for 56 percent of the metro population in 1950, as compared with 35 percent in 1990.[57] In many younger South and West metro areas, some city population gains (e.g., Dallas, San Diego, Phoenix) can be attributed to their "overboundedness" -- linked to a past, generous annexation of territory which often has a suburban character.[58]

An important, and often dominant, source of growth for some central cities during this decade was immigration. As in the past, immigrant minorities are drawn to central city locations which house existing enclaves of same country-of-origin residents. It is the city rather than the suburbs which stands to gain population in metros which attract large numbers of immigrants. Immigration played a dominant role in the 1980s population growth in New York City, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Miami and several other port-of-entry cities.

So, for a variety of reasons, central cities of the nation's largest metropolitan areas showed a 1980s rebound in population growth. The only large central cities which sustained significant population declines over the 1980s were clustered around the Great Lakes "Rustbelt". Even these declines became more moderated at the decade's end as their metropolitan area economies slowly adapted to the "jolts" inflicted by earlier manufacturing down-sizing. Still, none of these central city rebounds should be misinterpreted as city revival. City population gains that draw from particular economic niches or immigrant waves displacing long-gone suburbanites will not bring back the grander, more dominant central city that shaped urban America during most of its history. Rather than bringing a "revival," these trends simply buy a continued "survival" of central cities in what has become very much a suburban-dominated society.

PATCHWORK SUBURBS

America is in the suburbs. The suburbs are America. Both of these statements are valid, statistically, when referring to "the suburbs" as conventionally defined. That is, if suburbia is considered to be all of the metropolitan territory that lies outside its central cities, then 60 percent of metropolitan America is suburban. By the same token, the full range of population, housing, and land use characteristics that one can find in any part of America, can be found somewhere in America's suburbs.

Of course, if this is true, then the term suburban -- using this broad definition -- tends to lose its meaning. To say that 115 million Americans now live in the suburbs really does not imply very much that is distinct about their lifestyles, class backgrounds, or political leanings. It is more important to understand how differences in these attributes are emerging within the broad expanse of suburban territory which takes in full-fledged "suburban" cities, smaller communities, and unincorporated rural territory. Joel Garreau coined the term "Edge City" to denote suburban centers that became transformed from residential, rural or mixed-use territory into an area that local residents perceive to be a center of jobs, shopping and entertainment--whether or not it is an actual place, as defined by political boundaries. Using both empirical data and his journalistic skills, Garreau identified 203 such Edge Cities inside 36 large metropolitan areas. Many of these do not have names that one can find in standard census volumes. Examples are: "28 & Mass Pike" surrounding Boston; "the Galleria area" in suburban Houston; and "287 & 78" New Jersey, and suburbs of the greater New York area.[59]

What, then, does this suburban patchwork imply for our understanding of the changed dynamics within the suburban population? One solution might be to classify suburban territory, as closely as possible, to the following kinds of areas: (1) large, diversified suburban cities; (2) primarily employment centers; (3) primarily residential suburbs; and (4) a residual set of lower density areas.[60] Each of these could be further classed as "inner" and "outer" suburbs based on their proximity to the central city. Alden Speare applied this classification scheme to evaluate 1980s suburban growth in eight large metro areas representing different regions of the country (Boston, Detroit, Minneapolis-St. Paul, Atlanta, Houston, Phoenix, and Los Angeles).[61] His findings show, generally, highest rates of growth to occur in the low density residual portions of these metropolitan areas, with the next-highest growth rates associated with outer residential suburbs-- then outer employment suburbs. Inner residential suburbs tend



FIGURE 10: Demographic Characteristics for PMSAs within Greater New York Metropolitan Region

to have higher growth rates than inner employment centers--which showed population declines for some metro ares. Speare's study lends support to this classification of suburban communities, that goes beyond the simple city-suburb dichotomy.

Suburbanization reaches an even greater level of complexity in the spread of territory that surrounds the nation's largest metropolises. The most extreme example occurs in the greater New York region. This is illustrated in Figure 10 which depicts all 12 metropolitan areas that comprise the broader New York region.[62] What these areas' statistics make plain is that the average population and housing characteristics of these entire metropolitan units, vary with distance from the New York metropolitan area -- which lies at the center of the region. The highest population growth rates are shown for the outlying metro areas: Monmouth-Ocean, and Middlesex-Somerset-Hunterdon, in New Jersey; Orange County, New York; and Danbury, Conn. These areas, as well as other outlying metros (Nassau-Suffolk, New York; Stamford, Norwalk, and Bridgeport-Milford, CT) exhibit highest levels of "suburban" demographic characteristics such as percent home ownership, percent family households, percent married couples, and percent white populations. At the other extreme lie the inner metros: Jersey City, New Jersey and, to a lesser extent, Newark, New Jersey. These metro area units registered population declines during the 1980s, have relatively low levels of home ownership, and possess demographic characteristics that are much more consistent with the New York metro area, located at the center of the region.

[Figure 10 here]

Clearly, important community distinctions can be made both within as well as across the metros that are associated with the greater New York region. What these data illustrate is that the suburbanization process in a large metropolis like New York has far reaching impacts. To the extent that suburban race and ethnic compositions are involved, these impacts will be greatest in major metropolises that continue to receive large influxes of immigrants from abroad (such as Los Angeles and San

Francisco) or serve as favored destinations for minority internal migrants (such as Atlanta for Blacks).

G. CITY-SUBURB STATUS GAPS

When the suburbanization movement was just beginning, it was the suburbs that were the distinctive part of the metropolitan area. Suburban migration selected only the most financially well-off residents -- who were able to afford the more expensive suburban housing and lot sizes as well as the increased costs of commuting to central city jobs.[63] Back then, central cities still pretty much comprised a cross-section of the entire urban area's population mix and it was the suburbs that were different. This is no longer the case in most of metropolitan America. For reasons discussed above, suburbia is now much more representative of the entire area's population mix, and it is the central cities that are different.

This section will discuss how central cities differ on several socio-economic status characteristics. The city-suburb status gap emerged not only as a consequence of several decades of selective suburbanization but also, in some areas, to recent city-directed immigrant flows that add to the less well-off segments of the population. As on other dimensions discussed in this chapter, the city-suburb status gap varies across metropolitan areas in different regions, and different suburbanization or immigration histories.[64] The gap also depends on the specific status measure that is being compared.

EDUCATION GAPS

To what degree are central city populations less well educated than those of the remainder of the metro area? The answer to this question has implications for a variety of issues. At the upper end, it is important that cities have a sufficient pool of well-educated college graduates who could be counted on to provide leadership in both government and informal community organizations. This serves to insure that the population, in general, constitutes a generally informed citizenry. At the other end of

Table 7: City-Suburb Measures of Socioeconomic Status 1990 for selected Metro Areas and Region, Metropolitan Categories

Metro Areas, Regions & Metropolitan Categories	% College Grads*			% Less Than High School*			Per Capita Income			% Poverty		
	City	Suburbs	Diff.	City	Suburbs	Diff.	City	Suburbs	Diff.	City	Suburbs	Diff.
Selected Metro Areas												
New York	23	34	11	32	18	14	$16,334	$24,056	$7,722	19	7	13
Detroit	11	20	10	36	20	16	$10,056	$17,873	$7,817	30	6	24
Atlanta	27	27	0	29	19	10	$15,332	$17,182	$1,850	26	7	19
Los Angeles	23	22	-2	32	28	3	$16,128	$16,168	$40	18	12	6
REGION TOTALS												
Northeast	21	25	5	32	19	12	$14,449	$18,328	$3,879	19	6	13
Midwest	20	22	2	26	18	8	$12,496	$16,488	$3,992	19	6	13
South	22	21	-1	27	23	4	$13,354	$15,066	$1,712	19	10	9
West	25	23	-2	23	20	3	$15,172	$16,458	$1,286	15	10	5
U.S. TOTALS												
Large Metropolitan	23	26	3	29	19	10	$14,551	$17,953	$3,402	18	7	11
Medium Metropolitan	21	20	-1	26	23	3	$13,082	$15,091	$2,009	17	9	8
Small Metropolitan	22	16	-6	23	25	-2	$12,548	$12,692	$144	18	11	6
TOTAL	22	23	1	27	20	7	$13,840	$16,507	$2,667	18	8	10

* Persons aged 25 and older

the spectrum, there is often a concern that large pools of unskilled, less educated workers will not match well with the white collar, management, employment opportunities that are being created in many central cities. This is especially the situation in cities that are establishing niches as corporate, financial service or information centers for the surrounding metropolitan area or region.[65]

The 1990 census findings indicate that, overall, central cities are less disadvantaged at the upper end of the educational spectrum, than they are at the lower end. That is, in comparison to the rest of the metro area, cities tend to have smaller shares of college graduates and greater shares of persons with less than high school educations--when compared to their suburbs. But this city-suburb imbalance is far more lopsided at the lower end of the educational spectrum. Many college graduates and professionals still choose to live in central cities because of the amenities and easy access to employment it offers. This is especially the case for singles and childless couples. For the less educated segments of the city population, there is often little choice to locate elsewhere.

The data in Table 7 provide evidence for these two different dimensions of the city-suburb education gap. They also show that these gaps can vary across metropolitan areas. In fact, the college grad gap is either nonexistent or reversed (such that central cities have the advantage) in metropolitan areas in the South and West. Many of these cities contain upscale, gentrified neighborhoods, and southern central cities have a history of attracting the more elite segments of the urban area.[66] Western metropolitan areas tend to be "overbounded," where the outer perimeter of central city boundaries takes in neighborhoods and local communities that have more of a suburban character. Smaller metropolitan areas, in all four regions, show this reverse college grad gap. Some of this can be explained by the fact that the suburban territory also includes rural and semi-rural enclaves with older, less well educated populations.

[Table 7 here]

Although central cities can sometimes attract the best educated segments of the metro area's population, they are much more likely to house a disproportionately high number of the metro's unskilled population. Except for smaller metropolitan areas in the Midwest, South and West, the status gap is fairly pervasive. Overall gaps are particularly large in older metropolitan areas with significant minority populations. This is because selective suburbanization has occurred for a longer period of time in these areas and because Blacks, and particularly, Hispanics have lower levels of education attainment than do whites. Nonetheless, many central cities house substantial populations with less than high school educations and create important "mismatches" with the kinds of employment opportunities that are now being created there. (See the chapter by John Kasarda elsewhere in this volume).

INCOME AND POVERTY GAPS

Measures of income and poverty show a much more consistent status gap across metropolitan areas. The per capita income for the nation's combined central city population was $13,840 in 1990, compared to $16,507 for the suburbs. This gap is higher for large and medium-sized metros in the Northeast and Midwest regions and large metro areas in the South. Smaller metropolitan areas and western metropolitan areas show smaller city-suburb differences, and only occasionally are there "reverse" gaps in these areas.

The overall patterns tend to be reinforced by each minority group and, generally, for whites. A major exception to the latter occurs for whites in some South and West metros where there is a tendency for wealthy whites to reside in the city and considerably raise the per capita income shown for those areas. This is the case in Atlanta, where the per capita income for whites in the city is more than $9000 greater than in the suburbs. Still, Atlanta's overall city per capita income is lower than that for the suburbs as a consequence of its large, relatively low income city Black population.

The status gap between the central city's and suburb's poverty percentage is somewhat more consistent across areas, regions, and races. The national city poverty rate in 1990 was 18 percent, compared to only 8.1 percent in the suburbs. However there were wide variations in the poverty levels across cities. At the extreme are areas like Detroit where poverty is exacerbated by the existence of isolated, concentrated poverty ghettos. City-suburb disparities are more pronounced in such areas, which tend to be located in large metros of the Midwest and Northeast regions. These disparities are less sharp in the South and West, particularly in smaller metropolitan areas. For many of the latter, suburban poverty is relatively high due to the existence of, often, rural concentrations of Blacks and Hispanics.

Nonetheless, central city poverty rates are generally higher, and often much higher, than those of the suburban part of the metro area. The linkage between poverty and the concentration of minorities in many older, industrial northern cities symbolizes the increased isolation of the central city from the larger metropolitan unit.

H. MINORITY SUBURBANIZATION AND SEGREGATION

Historically, the residential distribution of minority racial and ethnic groups has been far more clustered within metro areas than has been the case for majority whites. Yet, several national demographic trends of the 1980s held out the prospect for a much more widespread residential integration of minorities--both into the suburbs, and across a wider range of neighborhoods. One of these trends is the increased size and diversity of immigrant flows which have helped to create demographically diverse populations in several metropolitan areas. Large inflows of new immigrant Hispanic and Asian populations can set off a chain reaction where more assimilated minorities move into integrated outer city or suburban communities. The prospects for this kind of integration should be particularly ripe in emerging "multi-ethnic" metropolitan areas

that are located in newer parts of the country.[67] In such areas suburban communities are still being developed and racial and ethnic "turf" has been less-well established.

Another reason that the 1980s decade was expected to reduce minority segregation at the local level draws from continued economic gains made by the nation's Black population. In the 1970s decade, the Black population registered noticeable but not dramatic increases in suburbanization and neighborhood integration.[68] Since another decade has passed when laws banning racial discrimination in housing sales were enforced and new cohorts of Blacks entered the middle class, it is reasonable to look for an even greater reduction in Black segregation during the 1980s.

Despite these improved contexts for minority integration, the record is one of not very much change from the familiar patterns of the past. Racial and ethnic minorities are still, largely, concentrated in central cities at the same time that whites predominate in the suburbs. Levels of neighborhood segregation for Hispanics, Asians and Blacks have not changed appreciably, either. However, this fairly static picture of minority concentration is most apparent at the national level. There are parts of the country where significant change has occurred and, happily, they are in the regions and areas which grew in population.

The discussions that follow evaluate the 1980s within-metropolitan minority concentration patterns from three perspectives. The first focus contrasts the racial compositions of central cities with their surrounding suburbs and identifies metro areas where suburban minority gains have been greatest over the last decade. As a second focus, minority suburbanization is evaluated from the perspective of specific minorities. Nationally, 39 percent of the minority population resided in the suburbs in 1990--compared with 67 percent for whites. How does this percentage vary for different minority groups and in different parts of the country? And which areas have shown the greatest increases over the 1980s?

The final part of this section focuses on neighborhood-level residential segregation of minorities. This discussion, as well, identifies variations in segregation by geography, and by specific racial and ethnic groups. Particular attention is given to Black segregation patterns in "multi-ethnic" metropolitan areas that are recipients of recent, large immigration flows. An important finding, here, is the considerable decline in Black segregation that is registered in most of these areas.

STILL MOSTLY WHITE SUBURBS

While the simple central city-suburb dichotomy is a crude one for most types of intra-metropolitan analysis, it still remains meaningful for the analysis of minority-majority white distribution. This is because all three major minorities--Hispanics, Asians and Blacks--remain more concentrated in central cities, than in suburbs, in most parts of the country.[69] Inner city racial and ethnic enclaves are still prevalent for new and recent immigrant minorities, and the history of discrimination in metros where large numbers of Blacks still live served to shape the current, largely city-only residences of the current Black populations. While it is true that all three minorities exhibited a higher percentage growth in the nation's suburbs than in its central cities (see Figure 11), the impact of this suburban growth for minority population change is relatively small. This is because these high growth rates are applied to tiny initial suburban minority populations.

[Figure 11 here]

Nationally, minorities comprised 41 percent of the central city population and less than 18 percent of the suburban population. The minority share of both populations grew by about 5 percent over the 1980s so the city-suburb minority disparity remained about the same. Of course, these disparities vary widely across metropolitan areas. Detroit, where Blacks comprise most of the minority population, shows one of the most highly imbalanced city-suburb racial compositions. This is



Figure 11: Race/Ethnic Percent Compositions of Central City and Suburb Populations, 1980-90

attributable to decades of race-selective "white flight" accompanied by a minimal suburbanization of minorities, where institutionalized discrimination played an important role.[70] Blacks also make up most of Atlanta's minority populations, but here the central city-suburban racial distribution is somewhat less imbalanced than in Detroit--as a consequence of recent, high levels of Black suburbanization. This is facilitated by Atlanta's emerging status as a migration "magnet" for middle class Blacks.

Another contrast can be made between two metropolitan areas with multi-ethnic populations, that continue to grow via immigration--New York and Los Angeles. New York's city-suburb racial composition is much more imbalanced, as a result of its longer history of white suburbanization. Los Angeles is a newer, more sprawling metropolitan area that evolved in the low density mode. Blacks and other minorities have been spreading into the suburbs for several decades. As a consequence, its central city and suburb portions are both "minority majorities."

These illustrations point up the fact that a wide range of city-suburb racial and ethnic distributions exist across the nation's metropolitan areas. The most highly imbalanced distributions tend to occur in the older Northeast and Midwest regions, particularly among larger metropolitan areas. This is because these areas, like Detroit and New York, have undergone a longer history of whites-only suburbanization--just as decades of minority in-migrants (especially Blacks) were directed to central city destinations. A similar situation characterizes older southern metropolitan areas although, in many of these, the suburbs encircled originally rural-Black enclaves. It is in the younger southern metros and metros in the West where central city-suburb racial distributions are less distinct. This has to do, again, with the more recent, low density suburban development mode which is prevalent in this part of the country. It is also explained by the fact that minorities in the West are more likely to be Hispanics and Asians who are more prone than Blacks to locate in the suburbs.[71]

Despite these variations, it is still the case that most of suburban America is predominantly white. Only one-third of all individual metro suburban areas have minority percentages that are at least as large as the national suburban minority percentage (17.6 percent). And suburbs of only 11 metro areas--including several small Texas border towns--house "majority-minorities" (Los Angeles and Miami are the two largest). Nonetheless, more than three-quarters of all metros increased their suburban minority percentage over the 1980s. Large increases occurred within the suburbs of metros located in the high immigration states--especially California and Texas. Moreover, the minority compositions in many of these suburbs increased as a result of both minority gains and white losses. This suggests that the intra-metropolitan dynamics of racial turnover and integration are playing out quite differently in high immigration multi-ethnic metros. Aside from these special cases, a predominantly white suburbia continues to reign in 1990. And in those suburbs which have attracted significant minority shares, the minorities still tend to be confined to a small subset of suburban communities.[72]

SUBURBAN EXPOSURE

In contrast to the previous discussion focusing on the suburb's race and ethnic composition, this discussion focuses on specific minority group's exposure to the suburbs. Which minority groups are more likely to reside in the suburbs? In what kinds of areas is this likely to occur? And where has minority suburban exposure increased the most? Based on the simple measure "proportion residing in the suburbs," national statistics show that suburban exposure is greatest for Asians, followed by Hispanics, then Blacks (with respective proportions of .51, .43 and .32). All three groups have lower suburban proportions than majority whites (at .67), yet each of the three groups increased their suburban exposure over the 1980s, if only slightly, based on nation-wide statistics.[73] Of course, just residing in "the suburbs" does not

necessarily mean that minorities share the same housing, neighborhood conditions, and access to services that is often associated with suburban living.[74] But it does provide a crude indicator of progress in this direction for purposes of comparing minority group's progress across areas and over time.

All three minorities tend to be more confined to the central city in the Northeast and Midwest regions than in the South and West. Again, this has to do with the history of suburban development in the former areas which made the city boundary a much more formidable barrier to cross for minorities, especially Blacks. In 1990, the Black suburban proportion was .22 in northern metros, in comparison with .39 in the South and .41 in the West. For Hispanics, these regional differences were not much higher than Blacks in the northern and southern metropolitan areas (with suburban proportions of .27 and .41, respectively), but increased significantly in the West (.53). Variation in suburban exposure is not as sharp for Asians. In both the North and South they are significantly more likely to reside in the suburbs than Blacks or Hispanics (Asian North and South suburban proportions are .45 and .58). In the West, their suburban proportion of .51 is closer to Hispanics, leaving Blacks to lag behind both groups.

The increasing suburban exposure of Blacks is of particular interest in light of their long history of relegation to city-only residences. During the 1970s, the black suburban proportion increased slightly (from .23 to .27), after registering a <u>decrease</u> during the 1960s.[75] The national increase in the black suburban proportion, over the 1980-90 decade, was only slightly higher -- from .27 to .32. And while black suburban proportions increased in about two-thirds of all metros during the 1980s, substantial increases occurred in only a handful. Atlanta experienced the greatest increase from .45 in 1980 to .63 in 1990. Large gains were also seen for Washington, D.C., Dallas and Houston in the South, as well as Seattle, Denver and Riverside-San Bernardino in the West. A number of northern metros also showed black suburbanization increases,



Figure 12: 1990 Proportions Residing in Suburbs by Years of Schooling and Race-Ethnicity for U.S. Metropolitan Population and Selected Metropolitan Areas.

Source: 1990 US Census data from Frey and Fielding (1993).

yet their increases tended to be smaller in the 1980s than in the previous decade. These patterns indicate that the door to black suburbanization is not open very wide and that future gains are most likely to be made in metro areas that house and continue to attract a growing black middle class population. These include "New South" metros like Atlanta and Dallas, as well as areas in other parts of the country that have begun to attract more college-educated and professional blacks.

The link between socioeconomic status and suburban exposure has not always been a strong one for minorities, and particularly the black population.[76] That is, typically whites at all socioeconomic levels were more likely to live in the suburbs than even the most educated, highest income blacks. Especially for Blacks, increased education or a rise in income did not necessarily imply a greater probability of suburban residents. Some of this scenario still applies in 1990 as illustrated in Figure 12.

[Figure 12 here]

In the US as a whole, it is still the case that whites of all education levels are more suburbanized than even Black college graduates. However, more so than in the past, there is a stronger link between Black socioeconomic status and residence in the suburbs. This link has become accentuated during the 1980s. Of course, the national statistics do not mirror all individual metro areas and three distinct patterns are illustrated for Detroit, Dallas, and Los Angeles. In each of these -- areas with very different Black suburbanization histories--Black gains in education are linked with increased suburban exposure (1980-1990 change data are not shown in the Figure). This is the case even in Detroit where overall Black suburban exposure levels are much lower than other race and ethnic groups. Particularly in the 1980s, college graduate Blacks are leading the move to the suburbs.

For Dallas, the education--suburban linkage--is new with 1990 and attributable to substantial 1980s increases in suburban proportions among high school and college

educated Blacks. A similar pattern is evident in Atlanta and several other "New South" areas that are attracting middle-class Black in-migrants. Los Angeles represents a different model, where Black suburbanization has occurred for several decades. The link between socioeconomic gains, and suburban location was already in place, reinforced by modest Black suburban exposure increases at all education levels.

The charts in Figure 12 also provide a perspective on Asian and Hispanic suburbanization. That is, while these group's suburban exposure levels tend to lie in-between those of whites and Blacks, their socioeconomic status-suburban location linkage is far more pronounced. For these groups, increases in socioeconomic status represent a far more significant stepping stone to suburban residence than is the case for Blacks. This is consistent with earlier research that shows that for both Hispanics and Asians, increased socioeconomic achievement, and residence in the country, are related to greater spatial integration of whites.[77]

RACE AND ETHNIC SEGREGATION

A final perspective on within-metro race and ethnic concentration focuses on segregation at the neighborhood level. A common index of neighborhood segregation is the Index of Dissimilarity which was popularized in Karl and Alma Taeuber's classic, Negroes in Cities.[78] As used here, this index measures the degree to which one race or ethnic group is distributed evenly across neighborhoods (census-defined block groups) than is the case with the rest of the population. For example, the index for blacks compares the distribution of all Blacks across neighborhoods compared with the distribution of all non-Blacks across neighborhoods. Segregation scores on this index can vary between 0 and 100, where 0 indicates complete integration (e.g., Blacks are distributed exactly the same as non-Blacks) and 100 indicates complete segregation (e.g., Blacks are in completely different neighborhoods than non-Blacks). The segregation score can also be interpreted as the percent of the group's population which

would have to move in order to be distributed like the rest of the population. Segregation scores above 60 are considered to indicate a high level of segregation, whereas those below 30 are considered to be low.[79]

When calculated for 1990, Black segregation is considerably higher than Hispanic or Asian segregation, consistent with past patterns.[80] What is not consistent with the past is the fairly pervasive decrease in the Black segregation score among nearly nine-tenths of metropolitan areas with at least minimal Black populations. At the same time, the majority of metros with minimal Hispanic and Asian populations showed segregation increases for those groups. The trends for Blacks and Hispanics were already hinted at in the 1970s.[81] Increased Asian segregation is new and, like heightened Hispanic concentration, follows from the deluge of recent immigrants who tend to cluster in same-group neighborhoods.

Many of these segregation changes are small in magnitude. However, the most notable ones which began anew with the 1980s--involves the reduced segregation of Blacks in "multi-ethnic" metropolitan areas. The discussion below briefly reviews the post-1980 segregation shifts for Hispanics and Asians, Blacks, and the unique segregation changes that began to occur within multi-ethnic metros.

Hispanics and Asians Both Hispanic and Asian populations showed widespread segregation increases over the 1980s. This can be related to their high immigration levels, where new immigrants "pile up" in immigrant enclaves.

The average Hispanic segregation score was 43 among the 132 metros with minimal 1990 Hispanic populations,[82] while individual metro segregation scores ranged from 15 to 71, most were in the range of 25-60. Highest Hispanic segregation scores exist in the northeast metropolitan areas, where Puerto Ricans comprise a large share of the population. Moderate-sized metro areas surrounding the New York region--in Pennsylvania and New England--are among the most highly segregated areas with

respect to Hispanics. At the other extreme are Pacific coastal areas and those in the Southwest where segregation scores hover in the 30s and 40s range. Still, traditional "port-of-entry" Hispanic metros--Los Angeles, New York, Miami and Chicago--register segregation scores in the 50s which are propped up by continued levels of concentrated Hispanic immigration. Other areas which received Hispanic migrants for the first time in the 1980s, increased their segregation--accounting for the fact that slightly over half of the metros experienced some increase in their Hispanic segregation score.

As with Hispanics, the average 1990 Asian segregation score was also 43 (among the 66 metros with at least sufficiently large Asian populations to permit calculation of meaningful indices). These scores tend to fall within a narrower range with most metros pulling 30s-40s level segregation. Yet again, the large "port-of-entry" areas exhibit some of the highest scores--including Honolulu (63), New York (52), Los Angeles (45), San Francisco (47), and Chicago (54). Most of these areas increased their segregation over the 1980s. Metros with low Asian segregation scores are found in the West but not the traditional Asian destination areas. Many are located outside of California, such as Las Vegas, Reno, or Denver. Still, in the 1980s, most metros increased their Asian segregation scores, if only slightly. The greatest increases occurred in areas that attracted the lower status new Asian groups--Vietnamese, Cambodians and Laotians.

Blacks As indicated above, Black segregation declines were pervasive during the 1980s. Among the 232 metros with sufficient Black populations to calculate indices, the average 1990 Black segregation score was 64--five points lower than the 1980 average. There are several similarities in the trends for Black neighborhood segregation and those for Black suburbanization, discussed above. First, the geographic locations of areas with highest segregation tended to be in the Northeast and Midwest--areas that also showed lowest Black suburbanization. (Gary, Detroit, Chicago, and Cleveland led

all metros with segregation scores in the upper 80s.) Second, areas that showed the greatest decreases in Black segregation tended to be located in growing, newer parts of the country where much of the housing stock was built since the enactment of the 1968 Civil Rights Act. The large metro areas which showed the greatest segregation declines included "New South" areas, Dallas (from 80 to 64), Orlando (from 81 to 65), and Atlanta (from 79 to 72), as well as several western metros which also attracted many middle class Blacks during the 1980s.[83]

Black Declines in "Multi-ethnic" Metros. The large waves of Hispanic and Asian immigration during the 1980s have had significant effects on many of the redistribution trends already discussed in this Chapter. An additional impact relevant to intra-metropolitan dynamics is the context that immigration and multi-ethnic metros provide for a reduction in Black segregation.[84] There are several reasons why this occurs.

First, most high immigration, multi-ethnic areas are not located in the "Black Belt" of the old South, nor are they typically first destinations of the original rural-to-urban Black migration streams out of the South. As a result, they do not have the long, sometimes turbulent, history of racial conflict, which is the case for many southern and industrial north metros. Second, the Black in-migrants of these multi-ethnic areas tend to be urban-origin "second destination" Black migrants. The middle class are able to afford to live in integrated, or suburban neighborhoods.

Third, the presence of an additional Hispanic or Asian ethnic group changes the mentality of the housing market away from a simple Black-white dynamic. The experience of past multi-ethnic areas has shown, at least, Hispanics to serve as a "buffer group" between Blacks and whites and helped to facilitate the stability of mixed, multi-ethnic neighborhoods.[85] The potential for "buffering" improves when the metro area's Black population is outnumbered by those of other minorities.

Fourth, the continuing immigration of Hispanics and Asians into these metro areas helped to fuel an out-migrant "flight" to other neighborhoods--of earlier generations for these groups, as well as whites. To the extent that Blacks are also pushed out of these areas, they will be more inclined to settle in newly emerging mixed race neighborhoods. Some of these may prove to be only "transitional," but there is evidence that many will remain integrated.

These processes are possible in multi-ethnic metros, and serve to counter the traditional white-to-Black neighborhood transition process that has been all too familiar in many northern, industrial metropolitan areas. That fact that these different racial transition patterns occur in these multi-ethnic areas was hinted at in studies of neighborhood transition during the 1970s.[86] A Los Angeles study showed that between 1970 and 1990 the percentage of whites living in mostly white neighborhoods fell from 75 percent to 29 percent. At the same time, the percentage of Blacks living in predominantly Black neighborhoods fell from 55 to only 13 percent. Fueled by the out-movement from largely Hispanic immigrant enclaves, Blacks and whites were more likely to reside in mixed-race neighborhoods in 1990.[87]

The effects of multi-ethnic metropolitan context are illustrated with the segregation scores that are presented in Table 6. Shown here are segregation indices for the 39 metro areas classed as "multi-ethnic." Each of these metro areas has greater than the national proportion of at least two of the three major minority groups--Blacks, Hispanics and Asians.[88] Recent immigration waves are strongly linked to most of these areas and their Hispanic and Asian populations are typically growing much faster than their Black populations. The impact of this context on Black segregation is apparent from the last column of the table. That is, over the 1980s, most of these areas reduced their Black segregation levels and in two-thirds of them, the reduction exceeded five points.

Table 8: Residential Segregation Scores and 1980-90 Changes for Race and Ethnic Groups
In Multi-Ethnic Metropolitan Areas

		1990 RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION SCORES			1980-90 CHANGE IN SCORE FOR:		
Metropolitan area*	Race/Ethnic Group**	Latinos/ Non-Latinos	Asians/ Non-Asians	Blacks/ Non-Blacks	Latinos/ Non-Latinos	Asians/ Non-Asians	Blacks/ Non-Blacks
NEW YORK	Black-Latino-Asian	54	52	71	-1	0	-3
CHICAGO	Black-Latino-Asian	66	54	86	0	1	-4
HOUSTON	Latino-Black-Asian	49	49	66	-1	-1	-11
OAKLAND	Black-Latino-Asian	35	37	64	1	1	-8
JERSEY CITY	Latino-Black-Asian	47	49	68	-5	-4	-9
DALLAS	Black-Latino	50	49	64	1	-1	-16
MIAMI	Latino-Black	56	40	74	-1	1	-6
NEWARK	Black-Latino	59	43	81	-2	0	-1
KILLEEN, TX	Black-Latino	22	38	43	-5	0	-7
GALVESTON	Black-Latino	32	47	64	-2	-5	-10
WACO, TX	Black-Latino	43	49	60	-1	-4	-11
VINELAND, NJ	Black-Latino	54	48	55	-3	-4	2
LOS ANGELES	Latino-Asian	53	45	66	0	1	-12
RIVERSIDE	Latino-Asian	38	38	47	-1	4	-10
SAN DIEGO	Latino-Asian	43	45	54	4	3	-7
ANAHEIM	Latino-Asian	53	36	40	9	8	-4
SAN FRANCISCO	Asian-Latino	45	47	61	4	-1	-4
SAN JOSE	Latino-Asian	45	37	38	2	8	-5
SACRAMENTO	Latino-Asian	34	46	54	-1	1	-3
BERGEN, NJ	Latino-Asian	56	41	73	-2	-1	-6
LAS VEGAS	Latino-Asian	30	28	49	6	1	-14
OXNARD, CA	Latino-Asian	53	35	42	1	-1	-8
FRESNO, CA	Latino-Asian	46	46	54	-1	15	-9
BAKERSFIELD, CA	Latino-Asian	53	47	56	1	1	-8
STOCKTON, CA	Latino-Asian	34	52	54	-1	12	-9
VALLEJO, CA	Latino-Asian	26	45	46	3	4	-5
MODESTO, CA	Latino-Asian	37	40	43	-4	5	-12
SANTA BARBARA	Latino-Asian	46	33	44	5	3	1
SALINAS, CA	Latino-Asian	58	36	60	2	2	-7
VISALIA, CA	Latino-Asian	44	49	58	3	3	-3
RENO, NV	Latino-Asian	36	33	46	18	6	-1
SANTA CRUZ, CA	Latino-Asian	57	29	39	4	-4	-2
MERCED, CA	Latino-Asian	35	48	43	-4	10	-6
YUBA CITY, CA	Latino-Asian	33	41	49	5	6	1
BRYAN-C-T, TX	Latino-Asian	35	56	53	-6	10	-19
WASHINGTON DC	Black-Asian	41	39	66	8	0	-5
TRENTON	Black-Asian	51	49	74	0	1	-2

* Abbreviated Name

** denotes minority groups (Blacks, Latinos or Asians) which comprise a percent of the metropolitan area's population that exceeds the group's percent of the US populati
(Note: Minority percentages of the US population in 1990 were: 12.1 percent Blacks; 9 percent Hispanics; 2.9 percent Asians.)

In nine of these areas, Black segregation was reduced by at least ten points, and this list includes large metros--Los Angeles (-12), Dallas (-16), and Houston (-11). It appears that in these areas two kinds of effects are working. First, there is the impact of multi-ethnic context which increases the integration possibilities for reasons discussed above. Second, these areas are attractive to middle class Black migrants--who are more easily assimilated into integrated, middle class neighborhoods. These two kinds of areas--multi-ethnic metros and Black middle class magnet metros--were most strongly linked to Black segregation declines during the 1980s decade.

[Table 6 here]

I. TRENDS TOWARD BALKANIZATION

The spatial demographic shifts that are characterizing the 1980s and 1990s are a far cry from the 1970s days of snowbelt urban declines, Texas oil booms, and California dreaming. Nor is there much talk of a back-to-nature rural renaissance. The new, post-1980 urban revival is an uneven one -- rewarding corporate nodes, information centers, and other tie-ins to the global economy. Areas specializing in high-tech manufacturing and recreation have also grown. And while these kinds of areas can be found in most parts of the country, they are now especially prominent in newly developing regions -- the South Atlantic coastal states, and states around California.

The population growth in these areas, fueled largely by industrial restructuring, can be contrasted with the immigration-driven growth in the large port-of-entry metro areas located in California, Texas, the greater New York region, Miami, and Chicago where immigration has been dominated by Hispanic and Asian minorities. The demographic make-ups of these areas in terms of race, age, poverty and skill level are becoming more distinct from the former areas which are attracting, in some cases, native-born white and black professionals and, in other cases, amenity-seeking retirees. At the same time, a broad swath of the interior part of the country is

not attracting any of these groups. These are largely white and continue to age as a result of the out-migration of the young.

Industrial restructuring, immigration, and segmented redistribution patterns along the lines of race, status and age have served to widen demographic disparities across broad regions and metropolitan areas. Such disparities also exist within metropolitan areas where the suburbs have now come to dominate. In many of the older metropolitan areas, central cities do not resemble mainstream America in the sense that they disproportionately house the poor, the unskilled, and minority populations, while their suburbs represent much more of a cross-section of American life. Yet, segmentation occurs within the suburbs, as well, and there is the need for a new nomenclature that goes beyond the simple city-suburb typology.

Racial segregation is one area in which simply taking a national snapshot is misleading. When this is done, one finds only modest improvements in black suburbanization and neighborhood integration over the 1980s decade. However, regional black migration patterns have become much more like those of whites. Those areas that are most attractive to middle class blacks -- such as Atlanta, Dallas, and Washington, D.C. -- have shown significant increases in black suburbanization and integration. Another type of area where black integration has risen noticeably are the West Coast and Southwest "multi-ethnic" immigrant port-of-entry areas such as Los Angeles, and Houston. In most parts of the country, black segregation levels are substantially greater than those for other minority groups. The trend toward convergence displayed by the areas just described, is the exception.

The portrait that has been painted in this review of post-1980 population shifts is clearly one of divisions -- divisions across areas of growth and decline, divisions brought on by the segmented redistribution pattern of immigrants, minorities, whites, and even across age groups, and divisions between cities and suburbs as well as within the suburbs. The latter divisions, those within metropolitan areas, are most familiar because they have evolved over decades. What is new with the trends of the 1980s and 1990s are redistribution patterns which reinforce divisions <u>across</u> broad regions and metropolitan areas. A demographic balkanization is a likely

outcome if these trends continue. The large multi-ethnic port-of-entry metros will house decidedly younger, more diverse and ethnically vibrant populations than the more staid, white older populations in declining regions, while the more educated middle-aged populations will reside in the most prosperous regions. The geographic boundaries that take shape according to these distinctions will surely bring profound changes to established economic and political alliances as well as to the lifestyles and attitudes of residents of these areas. Yet, this "balkanization" scenario may be premature. Forces which strongly influence these patterns -- industrial restructuring and focused immigration -- could very well become altered as the global market place changes, as minority immigrants assimilate in their migration patterns, and as technological improvements continue to re-invent the way we work, travel and communicate. Still, the current trends toward greater regional demographic divisions are unmistakable, and need to be watched closely in the decade ahead.

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