William H. Frey

Emerging Demographic Balkanization: Toward One America or Two?

Report No. 97–410

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Emerging Balkanization: Toward One America or Two?

by William H. Frey

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Abstract: Current debates about the future of immigrant assimilation or an emergent multiculturalism in America overlook an important new demographic divide across the nation's geography. This divide may soon supplant other well-known demographic divides across space: rural vs. urban, city vs. suburb, and the sharp racial cleavages across neighborhoods. It is separating those regions of the country which continue to serve as "immigrant gateways" from the remainder of the national territory where the new immigration makes much smaller or negligible contributions to growth. The former areas are becoming increasingly younger, multi-ethnic, and culturally diverse -- a demographic profile which shows little signs of spilling over into the whiter or white-black regions of the country with older and more middle class populations.

This paper presents evidence which demonstrates that a new kind of demographic divide is under way. It identifies key immigrant gateway regions of the country and how they are becoming distinct in terms of their race-ethnic makeup, their dual economy character, their uniquely different poverty profiles, age dependency characteristics and patterns of inter-racial marriage. The concluding section discusses what the current trends will imply if projected into the future and why the ideal of "One America," nationwide, might be difficult to maintain through the next century.

Datasets used: 1990 US Census special migration tabulations; 1990-96 US Census Bureau Postcensal estimates; 1996 Current Population Survey.

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A New Demographic Divide

Current debates about the future of immigrant assimilation or an emergent multiculturalism in America (Geyer, 1996; Glazer, 1997; Salins, 1997) overlook an important new demographic divide across the nation's geography. This divide may soon upplant other well-known demographic divides across space: rural vs. urban, city vs. suburb, and the sharp racial cleavages across neighborhoods. It is separating those regions of the country which continue to serve as "immigrant gateways" from the remainder of the national territory where the new immigration makes much smaller or negligible contributions to growth. The former areas are becoming increasingly younger, multi-ethnic, and culturally diverse -- a demographic profile which shows little signs of spilling over into the whiter or white-black regions of the country with older and more middle class populations.

This new demographic division has become exacerbated over the past decade and has been shaped by the larger numbers and increased dominance of immigrants from Latin American and Asian origins. This change in national immigrant stock, which is likely to continue, has roots with formal and informal movements between Latin America and the US that has evolved over several decades as well as with a fundamental change in American immigration policy beginning in 1965 (Heer, 1996). Legislation in that year overturned national origin quotas that favored European immigrants, replacing it with a more open system that emphasizes migrant family reunification. While the nationwide impact of this immigration policy has been subject to much scholarly and official conjecture (Simon, 1989; Borjas, 1994; US Commission on Immigration Reform, 1994; Smith and Edmonston, 1997), most of the debate has focused on its economic impacts rather than its effects on the nation's social and political geography.

This paper makes the case that current immigration along with ongoing domestic migration forces is creating a "demographic balkanization" which portends increasing divisions across broad regions of the country. If the new trends continue, today's highly multi-ethnic, immigrant gateway regions may very well turn into individual melting pots where different Hispanic, Asian, African American, native American and Anglo groups coexist, intermarry, while still retaining some elements of their own national heritage. Although this ideal image of "One America" may be approximated in *these* regions, it will be less achievable nationally. The rest of the country which will look demographically quite distinct, where different political agendas will come to the fore, and where there will be a lower tolerance for the issues and concerns of ethnically more diverse populations in other regions.

This paper presents evidence which demonstrates that a new kind of demographic divide is under way. It identifies key immigrant gateway regions of the country and how they are becoming distinct in terms of their race-ethnic makeup, their dual economy character, their

uniquely different poverty profiles, age dependency characteristics and patterns of inter-racial marriage. The concluding section discusses what the current trends will imply if projected into the future and why the ideal of "One America," nationwide, might be difficult to maintain through the next century.

Immigrant Concentrations

For most of America's history, immigrants flocked to cities due to the attractions of jobs and the existence of like nationality groups that formed enclaves which provided both social and economic support. These same cities also attracted large numbers of domestic migrants from smaller communities and from rural areas, again because of the availability of jobs which tended to concentrate in immigrant gateways such as New York, Chicago, and Boston (Ferrie, 1996).

Today's immigrants also cluster in major gateway areas -- two-thirds of 1985-1996 immigrants located in just 10 of the nation's 280 metropolitan areas. Although this may seem natural and consistent with the past, it is inconsistent with the fact that the nation's employment opportunities and population in general have become much more dispersed across all regions of the country. Today, only about a quarter of the native-born US population resides in these 10 gateway areas.

The continued concentration of immigrants to the United States is an important ingredient of the emerging demographic balkanization. Despite the dispersion of jobs to other parts of the country, immigrants continue to concentrate. Evidence suggests that much of this concentration is influenced by the strong "family reunification provisions" of the post-1965 immigration law which reoriented dominant immigrant origins toward Latin American and Asian nations. Family reunification immigration tends to occur in "chains" that link family members and friends to common destinations (Massey et al., 1994; Pedraza and Rumbaut, 1996). This is especially the case for lower-skilled immigrants since they are more dependent on social capital and kinship ties for assistance in gaining entry to informal job networks that exist in port-of-entry areas (Portes, 1995).

Research by Borjas (1994) and a National Academy Panel (Smith and Edmonston, 1997) points up an increasing gap in the education attainment of immigrants as compared with the native population. Although the education attainment of immigrants is bimodal, with higher percentages of Ph.D.s and of high school dropouts than the native population, it is the lower end of the educational distribution which dominates recent immigrant streams. Thirty-seven percent of working-aged immigrants over the 1985-1990 period had not completed a high school education compared with 15 percent of native-born working-aged residents.

The concentrating effects of Latin American and Asian origins, as well as lower skill levels, for recent immigrants is supported in a study by Liaw and Frey (1998a). The study examines State destination patterns for 20 to 34 year-old US immigrants and finds that 76 percent of all Hispanic immigrants locate in just five States (California, New York, Texas, Florida, Illinois) and that 59 percent of Asians are similarly concentrated (California, New York, Texas, New Jersey, Illinois). Within each group, those with less than high school educations are the most highly concentrated (81 percent of such Hispanics, and 64 percent of such Asians are located in just five States). This clustering is consistent with findings from an earlier study of immigrant destinations in the 1970s (Bartel, 1989). Liaw and Frey's further statistical analyses show that the attraction of a State's racial composition (Hispanic, Asian, White, or Black) -- as a

proxy for the influence of "friends and relatives"-- is more important than the State's employment growth or income levels, and this is especially the case for immigrants with high school educations or less.

Not only do recent immigrants continue to select the same immediate destinations upon arrival, but they have a tendency to remain there. The strong influence of friends and relatives is particularly important for immigration from Latin America and Asia because of their native language commonalties. Massey (1995) makes the case that the new immigration differs from earlier periods in that it is more concentrated linguistically as well as geographically. Other studies show that when Hispanic and Asian migration within the US does occur, it is highly channelized and follows the same race and ethnic networks (Bean and Tienda, 1987; McHugh, 1989; Pedraza and Rumbaut, 1996). The lack of a broad dispersal of foreign-born ethnic groups via internal migration is borne out in specific studies based on the 1980 census (Bartel and Koch, 1991) and the 1990 census (Nogle, 1997). They show that continued concentration is especially evident among foreign-born residents with lower education levels.

The continued concentration of post-1965 is apparent from Figure 1 which compares the native-born US population with different foreign-born year of arrival cohorts with respect to their residence in the 10 largest port-of-entry metropolitan areas. Foreign-born cohorts arriving since 1965 are more concentrated than those who arrived earlier and are far more concentrated than the native-born population. This pattern is especially evident for the Hispanic population (plotted separately). For the total foreign-born population and for the Hispanic foreign-born population, those who arrived in the 1965-1985 period are no more dispersed than those who arrived in the most recent decade. This is also the case for specific education attainment, family income, and age groups where the concentration levels are highest for those with high school educations or less. Clearly, these data, in concert with a plethora of recent research, make plain that the post-1965 immigrants are not "spilling out" into other parts of the country at a very rapid pace. In fact, they remain largely confined to their original ports-of-entry.

(Figure 1 here)

Immigrant Magnets, Native Magnets

In contrast to the post-1965 immigrants, native-born Americans, especially whites and blacks, are far more "footloose." That is, their economic and social circumstances do not as heavily constrain them to particular parts of the country, and their migration patterns are dictated much more strongly by the "pushes" and "pulls" of employment opportunities, and to some degree by quality of life amenities (Long, 1988; Gober, 1993). While for most of this century, "domestic migrants"[1] have been urbanizing, and moving to the same metropolitan destinations as immigrants, this has not been the case for the last decade (Frey, 1996a).

Is this because domestic migrants are fleeing immigrants? Not generally, although this appears to be occurring for a segment of the population (see "Immigrant Flight" below). Rather, it is because the focus of opportunities has shifted away from the more expensive, densely populated coastal metropolises such as New York and Los Angeles to less dense, faster growing, more entrepreneurial regions of the country. They include large metropolitan areas in the South

FIGURE 1

US Native and Foreign Born Population 1995

Percent Resident in 10 High Immigration Metropolitan Areas By Nativity and Foreign Born Year of Arrival and Race-Ethnicity



Atlantic region, and in western States surrounding California. They also include smaller-sized places in non-metropolitan territory within these fast-growing regions. Because the current "magnets" and growth for domestic migrants are, largely, different than the immigrant gateway metropolises, it is possible to classify most States and many large metropolitan areas by their dominant migration source.

The States and metropolitan areas which can be classed as either "High Immigration" areas or "High Domestic Migration" areas for the first part of the 1990s are shown in Table 1. What is striking is that these areas are fairly easy to classify because recent population change in each is dominated by one kind of migration or the other. Exceptions to this, for the early 1990s, are the States of Florida and Texas, and the Dallas metropolitan area (Florida is classed as "High Domestic Migration" State because its domestic migration substantially exceeds its immigration levels). However, within Florida, one can distinguish between the "High Immigration" Miami metro area and High Domestic Migration metros such as Tampa and Orlando (not shown) which lie within the State.

(Table 1 here)

An important point to be made is that the High Immigration States and High Immigration metros in the 1990-1996 period were the same States and metropolitan areas which received most immigrants during the 1980s and, in most cases, earlier decades (Frey, 1996b). This is consistent with the discussion above indicating that post-1965 immigrants continued to land and stay in these traditional port-of-entry regions. It is also important to emphasize that domestic migration for these "immigrant magnet areas" changes over time in accordance with the economic upturns and downturns of region-based economic growth. For example, although Texas shows a great deal of domestic migration gain in the 1990s, plummeting oil prices of the 1980s drove a sharp domestic out-migration from the State (Jennings, 1994) (see Figure 1). In contrast, California's economy was relatively robust in the late 1980s but it experienced a sharp downswing in the early 1990s as a result of defense cutbacks, a severe recession, and various natural disasters (Gabriel, Stuart, Mattey and Wascher, 1995).

(Figure 2 here)

Because of these economic shifts, the list of High Domestic Migration States and metro areas for the 1990s looks somewhat different than it did in the 1980s. While strong South Atlantic job-generating engines like Atlanta, Raleigh, and Charlotte attracted substantial domestic migration throughout, western and Rocky Mountain region metros such as Las Vegas, Phoenix, Portland and Denver have improved their rankings. This resurgence of the West involved, in some cases, overcoming extractive industry declines of the late 1980s, and the rise of new growth industries associated with computers, telecommunications and entertainment/recreation (Labich, 1994). What these areas have in common is that they are growing, largely, from domestic migration -- as immigrants and most of the recent foreign-born population remains confined to the more traditional port-of-entry regions.

Table 1: A Migration Classification of US States and Metro Areas for 1990-96

State	*Contribution to 1990-96 Change* Immigration	Net Domestic Migration	Metro Area	*Contribution to 1990-96 Change* Immigration	Net Domestic Migration
HIGH IMMIGRATION STATES*			***HIGH IMMIGRATION METROS***		
California	1,571,491	-1,855,045	Los Angeles CMSA	939,438	-1,305,950
New York	728,754	-1,225,379	New York CMSA	930,783	-1,331,740
Texas	474,376	426,696	San Francisco CMSA	311,092	-303,615
Illinois	232,612	-344,018	Chicago CMSA	232,528	-28,455
New Jersey	225,023	-251,013	Miami CMSA	224,630	-339,470
Massachusetts	100,606	-200,884	Washington DC CMSA	165,781	-121,675
			Houston CMSA	148,101	51,286
			San Diego MSA	109,948	114,723
			Boston NECMA	108,278	-182,216
			Dallas CMSA	95,249	-180,645
HIGH DOMESTIC MIGRATION STATES*			***HIGH DOMESTIC MIGRATION METROS***		
Florida	363,389	714,224	Atlanta MSA	49,812	319,100
Georgia	65,714	424,892	Las Vegas MSA	19,324	259,402
Arizona	73,629	380,719	Phoenix MSA	43,581	239,096
North Carolina	35,598	354,236	Portland CMSA	34,500	157,864
Washington	84,208	296,331	Denver CMSA	31,977	136,522
Colorado	40,064	282,759	Seattle CMSA	16,163	111,837
Nevada	27,986	280,655	Austin MSA	52,797	107,735
Tennessee	17,298	265,136	Raleigh MSA	9,139	105,490
Oregon	40,833	211,867	Orlando MSA	23,889	93,376
			Tampa MSA	8,952	91,423

*States with largest immigration (excepting Florida, where domestic migration substantially dominates)
**States with largest net domestic migration and substantially exceeds immigration

Source: Compiled by author from US Census postcensal estimates

FIGURE 2

Immigration and Internal Migration Rates for High Immigration States - 1985-90 and 1990-96



Another domestic redistribution trend which has come to the fore in the 1990s is the new "rural renaissance" where smaller sized communities and non-metropolitan areas are experiencing a resurgence of growth (Fuguitt and Beale, 1995). Unlike the rural renaissance of the 1970s which resulted largely from the downsizing of urban manufacturing jobs and an OPEC-induced demand for oil (Frey, 1995a), the current trend appears to be more permanent and sparked by advances in telecommunications -- giving rise to more diversified economies in smaller places which tend to be more amenity-laden and high-ranking on quality-of-life measures (Frey and Liaw, 1998; Frey and Johnson, 1998). This trend, along with the regional and new metropolitan gains highlighted above, is almost totally the product of domestic migration.

This last point is underscored with migration components of non-metropolitan growth shown in Table 2. The bottom panel indicates that non-metropolitan areas gained over 1.5 million domestic migrants during the first six years of the 1990s, whereas immigration's contribution to this growth was less than one-quarter million. So, while the immigrant population continues to concentrate in the 10 High Immigration metros, domestic migration tends to redistribute the largely native-born population to other metropolitan areas and non-metropolitan areas. This is especially the case in the West for small communities and rural areas in the States that surround California's immigrant magnets. It is also occurring in smaller communities of the South that represent major destinations for out-migrants from New York, Washington, Boston and other Eastern Seaboard immigrant magnets (Frey and Liaw, 1997).

(Table 2 here)

For at least the last decade domestic migration has occurred independently and toward different destination areas than the immigrant population. What is often overlooked is that domestic out-migration is relatively pervasive from both the central city and suburban areas that lie within High Immigration metros. This can be seen by examining the migration components for all of the counties of the Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Areas (CMSAs) centered around Los Angeles, San Francisco, and New York. These CMSAs are relatively broad regions yet domestic out-migration is pervasive within each. For example, of the 29 counties within the New York CMSA, 21 of them experienced net domestic out-migration over the 1990-1996 period. The 8 counties where domestic migration gains overshadow immigration gains are located, largely, on the periphery -- southern and eastern New Jersey, as well as Pike County, Pennsylvania. Similarly, 7 of the 10 counties comprising the San Francisco CMSA and 4 of the 5 fairly expansive counties of the Los Angeles CMSA register domestic out-migration along with immigration gains. What these patterns underscore is the fact that immigrant growth in High Immigration metros characterizes the entire metropolitan area rather than the central part only. This suggests that the old "city-suburb" distinction will be supplanted by a new, more regionally-based distinction to the extent that in an area's demographics influence its culture, lifestyles, and political preferences.

(Table 3 here)

Table 2: 1990-96 Migration Components for Metropolitan and Nonmetropolitan Areas with Regions

Geographic Category	1996 Population (oer Million)	Number of Migrants		Rates	
		Immigration	Domestic Migration	Immigration	Domestic Migration
NORTHEAST					
High Immigration Metro Areas	25.6	1,026,032	-1,512,385	4.08	-6.01
Other Metro Areas	20.5	155,414	-528,665	0.76	-2.59
Nonmetro Areas	5.4	11,613	12,799	0.22	0.24
MIDWEST					
High Immigration Metro Areas	8.6	224,630	-339,470	2.72	-4.11
Other Metro Areas	36.9	204,030	-197,544	0.57	-0.56
Nonmetro Areas	16.5	30,245	277,758	0.19	1.74
SOUTH					
High Immigration Metro Areas	19.5	656,358	15,879	3.69	0.09
Other Metro Areas	50.0	475,945	1,696,076	1.04	3.71
Nonmetro Areas	23.6	96,353	728,084	0.43	3.27
WEST					
High Immigration Metro Areas	24.7	1,358,808	-1,791,781	5.81	-7.67
Other Metro Areas	25.7	490,578	1,121,589	2.18	4.98
Nonmetro Areas	8.0	87,226	517,660	1.22	7.26
TOTAL US					
High Immigration Metro Areas	78.5	3,265,828	-3,627,757	4.38	-4.87
Other Metro Areas	133.2	1,325,967	2,091,456	1.07	1.68
Nonmetro Areas	53.5	225,437	1,536,301	0.44	3.03

Source: Compiled by the author from US Census postcensal estimates

Large Metro pertains to areas with populations greater than 1,000,000 people.
Race-Ethnic Compositions from 1994 US Census Estimates, Whites, Blacks, and Asians, exclude those of Hispanic Origin.

Table 3 : Immigration and Domestic Migration Components, 1990-96, Counties within Los Angeles, San Francisco, and New York Regions

Metropolitan Region County	PMSA	Immigration	Net Domestic Migration	1996 Population
Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange County, CA CMSA				
Los Angeles County,CA	Los Angeles-Long Beach	658,953	-1,177,810	9,127,751
Riverside County,CA	Riverside-San Bernardino	40,398	92,958	1,417,425
San Bernardino County,CA	Riverside-San Bernardino	41,774	-19,125	1,598,358
Orange County,CA	Orange County, CA	171,157	-169,262	2,636,888
Ventura County,CA	Ventura, CA	27,156	-32,711	714,733
San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose, CA CMSA				
San Francisco County,CA	San Francisco, CA	62,415	-58,136	735,315
San Mateo County,CA	San Francisco, CA	35,397	-31,704	686,909
Marin County,CA	San Francisco, CA	5,892	-9,269	233,230
Alameda County,CA	Oakland, CA	54,915	-82,621	1,328,139
Contra Costa County,CA	Oakland, CA	22,349	8,534	881,490
Santa Clara County,CA	San Jose, CA	102,000	-111,408	1,599,604
Santa Cruz County,CA	Santa Cruz-Watsonville, CA	8,917	-13,964	237,821
Sonoma County,CA	Santa Rosa, CA	7,477	9,247	420,872
Solano County,CA	Vallejo-Fairfield-Napa, CA	8,813	-14,585	365,536
Napa County,CA	Vallejo-Fairfield-Napa, CA	2,917	291	116,512
New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-CT-PA CMSA**				
Bronx County,NY	New York, NY	90,747	-177,463	1,193,775
Kings County,NY	New York, NY	222,545	-375,263	2,273,966
New York County,NY	New York, NY	117,499	-108,917	1,533,774
Queens County,NY	New York, NY	172,209	-222,629	1,980,643
Richmond County,NY	New York, NY	7,343	-5,323	398,748
Rockland County,NY	New York, NY	7,846	-8,277	278,136
Westchester County,NY	New York, NY	25,767	-37,218	893,412
Putnam County,NY	New York, NY	376	1,754	90,983
Nassau County,NY	Nassau-Suffolk, NY	28,247	-50,031	1,303,389
Suffolk County,NY	Nassau-Suffolk, NY	18,058	-40,663	1,356,896
Fairfield County,CT	New Haven, CT NECMA**	19,312	-45,894	833,761
New Haven County,CT	New Haven, CT NECMA**	7,775	-40,714	794,672
Bergen County,NJ	Bergen-Passaic, NJ	27,164	-24,045	846,498
Passaic County,NJ	Bergen-Passaic, NJ	28,840	-39,679	464,833
Hudson County,NJ	Jersey City, NJ	42,054	-67,048	550,789
Essex County,NJ	Newark, NJ	32,854	-84,461	755,089
Union County,NJ	Newark, NJ	17,848	-30,067	497,281
Morris County.NJ	Newark, NJ	9,568	-138	449,218
Sussex County, NJ	Newark, NJ	695	2,714	141,308
Warren County,NJ	Newark, NJ	421	2,134	97,574
Middlesex County,NJ	Middlesex-Somerset-Hunterdon, NJ	25,214	-24,727	702,458
Somerset County,NJ.	Middlesex-Somerset-Hunterdon, NJ	7,806	6,832	269,902
Hunterdon County,NJ	Middlesex-Somerset-Hunterdon, NJ	783	5,128	118,737
Monmouth County,NJ	Monmouth-Ocean, NJ	6,854	11,283	591,182
Ocean County,NJ	Monmouth-Ocean, NJ	1,808	37,606	474,102
Mercer County,NJ	Trenton, NJ	6,959	-12,956	330,226
Dutchess County,NY	Dutchess County, NY PMSA	1,831	-7,681	262,675
Orange County,NY	Newburgh, NY-PA	2,287	-4,575	324,422
Pike County,PA	Newburgh, NY-PA	73	8,578	38,139

* Defined as CMSAs (Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Areas)
** PMSA (Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area)

Source: Compiled by author from US Census postcensal estimates

Race and Space

One reason why it is important to separate areas whose current demographic change is dominated by immigration rather than domestic migration relates to a whole host of demographic characteristics that differ sharply between the two groups. Probably the most important of these attributes is the race-ethnic composition of these groups. During the 1980s and early 1990s, the combined legal immigration to the US is largely comprised of persons of Latin American and Asian origin -- estimated to be 85 percent (Martin and Midgley, 1994). When illegal immigration is included, Mexico becomes the dominant country of origin of all immigrants. While it is true that the particular mix of national origins differs with each port-of-entry area, the white (non-Hispanic white) component of immigrants to all of these areas is relatively small.

In contrast, domestic migrant streams between States and metropolitan areas are largely white or white and black. So areas that gain population mostly from domestic migrants are not increasing their multi-ethnic populations to a great degree via the migration component. This scenario is depicted in Figure 3 which contrasts the racial compositions of immigrant streams with those of domestic migration flows, over the 1985-1990 period, for four large "immigrant magnet" and four large "domestic migration magnet metropolitan areas." It is quite clear that in New York, Chicago, San Francisco, and especially in Los Angeles, the new immigrant minorities dominate the inflow of immigrants at the same time these areas are losing domestic migrants that are largely white or white and black.

(Figure 3 here)

This can be contrasted to the domestic migrant-gaining areas of Tampa, Phoenix, and Las Vegas whose inflows are predominantly white, and Atlanta whose domestic inflow also contains a substantial African-American population. Although this is just a snapshot of flows for a five-year period, the continuing influx of immigrants and domestic migrants of distinctive race-ethnic composition will shape the population structure of these different areas. For example, already in 1995 the State of California was 53 percent white, 30 percent Hispanic, and 11 percent Asian. By the year 2015, the white population will be only 38 percent and the combined Hispanic and Asian population will dominate the State with shares of 40 percent and 16 percent, respectively. In Georgia, on the other hand, continuation of these flows through the year 2015 will not change the State's racial composition appreciably. Its 1995 white population of 68 percent will be reduced to only 63 percent, and its black population will increase from 28 percent to 32 percent.

The fact that it is the High Immigration parts of the country that will show the most accentuated change in their race-ethnic composition is pointed up in Figure 4 which depicts both 1980 and 1996 race-ethnic profiles for: the 10 High Immigration metro areas, all other metro areas, and nonmetro areas. The sharpest increase in diversity over this 16-year period has clearly occurred within the cluster of the High Immigration areas. Their white populations became reduced from 69 percent to 58 percent, whereas the rest of the country saw negligible changes such that approximately four out of five residents continued to be white. Of course, particular areas will have different mixes of race and ethnic groups, but it is clear that immigration and



FIGURE 3 Migration Components for selected High Immigration Metros and High Internal Migration Metros, 1985-90

Source: William H. Frey, "Immigration and Internal Migration 'Flight' from US Metro Areas: Toward a New Demographic Balkanization" Urban Studies Vol 32 (May, 1995) (available from Publications, PopulationStudies Center, University of Michigan)

FIGURE 4

Race-Ethnic Compositions 1980 and 1996 for Metropolitan and Nonmetropolitan Areas



domestic migration patterns for the past two decades have served to cluster Hispanics and Asians into distinct regions of the country.

(Figure 4 here)

Immigrant Flight

The picture painted in the previous sections is one in which immigrants continue to be attracted to the same metropolitan regions based on the strong pulls of family and friendship networks that provide entree to economic opportunities which for them appear to be out of reach elsewhere. At the same time, domestic migrants are much more footloose and tend to "follow the money" or at least job opportunities coupled with amenities that may be available in any part of the country. In short, these are portrayed as somewhat independent patterns and, while this is true to a large extent, the fact that most High Immigration Metros are also losing domestic out-migrants gives rise to the theory that some "immigrant flight" may be occurring.

In fact, research by the author and his collaborators, focusing on migration patterns from the 1990 census and for the 1990s indicates that immigration does provide a "push" for a significant segment of domestic out-migrants -- those with lower skills and with lower incomes (Frey, 1994, 1995b; Frey, Liaw, Xie and Carlson, 1996; Frey and Liaw, 1998; Liaw and Frey, 1996). The accentuated out-migration of less-skilled native born residents is a relatively unique phenomenon. This is because domestic migration, within the United States, has typically selected from the *most* educated professional members of the work force -- a group that tends to be well apprised of nationwide geographic shifts in employment opportunities (Long, 1988). Normally, areas that are sustaining economic downturns will see highest out-migration rates among their college graduates and white collar workers. Similarly, areas which experience employment growth will see greatest rates of in-migration among highly educated workers (Frey, 1979).

The fact that this standard model is *not* the case for High Immigration states and metropolitan areas is new and noteworthy. It is consistent with the view that the concentrated influx of lower-skilled immigrants to these areas leads to their displacement from jobs as the immigrants bid down wages below those that native born workers would accept (Briggs, 1992; Borjas, Freeman, and Katz, 1996). The effect is illustrated in Figure 5, which contrasts immigration rates with native born domestic migration, by education levels, for the working age population of the Los Angeles metropolitan area over the 1985-90 period. The skewing of immigration toward the lowest levels of education represents a "mirror image" of the net out-migration patterns for Los Angeles' domestic migrants. This kind of pattern exists in almost all high-immigration metropolitan areas (Frey, 1995b; Frey and Liaw, 1998b). Moreover, statistical analyses which take into account other migration-inducing factors show that immigration exerts an independent effect on the net-out migration of less-skilled residents.[2]

(Figure 5 here)

FIGURE 5

Los Angeles Metro Region

Migration Rates, 1985-90, by Education



Frey and Liaw (1988b) have conducted simulation analyses to investigate how increases or decreases in current immigration levels would affect domestic migration of low-skilled residents. They find that, in California, a 50 percent decrease in immigration would reverse the outward flow of low-skilled, working-aged residents. The net out-migration of 59,000 persons with high school educations or less, would become a gain of +44,000 under a reduced immigration scenario. On the other hand, if immigration were doubled, net out-migration would increase to -249,000. Similarly, although somewhat less dramatic findings are shown in each of the High Immigration States, according to this analysis. The study also shows that within the low-skilled segments of these populations, the domestic out-migration responses to immigration are most heightened for persons in poverty, and especially for poverty whites.

This domestic migration response to immigration, on the part of less-skilled and poorer native-born residents appears irrespective of the overall economic conditions in the area. This is illustrated for Los Angeles (Figure 5) which experienced a net out-migration of its lower-skilled residents at the same time it *gained* college graduates. The latter gains are consistent with the "typical" migration model, since the late 1980s (compared with the 1990s) was a relatively prosperous time for the region. Therefore, the region was attracting well-educated professionals for available employment opportunities where for this segment of the population, immigration competition is minimal. In contrast, lower-skilled residents continued to confront immigration competition, irrespective of the relatively buoyant regional economy.

This can also be illustrated by contrasting domestic migration patterns between the late 1980s and 1990-96 for California and Texas. As indicated earlier, the economic fortunes of these two High Immigration States turned in opposite directions during this time frame. California's relatively prosperous economy in the late 1980's turned sour in the 1990's, while Texas sustained an economic resurgence as reflected in its changing overall domestic migration patterns (see Figure 2). Table 4 shows that the migration patterns for college-graduate and non-poor populations of both states reflect these overall trends. Yet, the poverty populations and less-skilled populations continue to exhibit a net out-migration during both the "good" and "bad" economic periods for both states. One constant in both instances is the continued inflow of less-skilled immigrants.

(Table 4 here)

There is another aspect to the immigrant-induced domestic out migration from port-of-entry areas: the "spillover" effects as they export less-skilled and poorer residents to other parts of the country. In the case of California, much of this spillover is directed to its nearby states (Frey, 1995d). In fact, over the 1985-90 period, California exported a net of approximately 10,000 poverty migrants each to the states of Oregon, Washington, and Arizona, and nearly 9,000 to Nevada (during the same period, California actually gained 3,000 poverty migrants from the rest of the U.S.). From these destination states' perspective, California exports are a mixed blessing. For example, about a third of Nevada's overall migration gains come from exchanges with California, but 62 percent of its poverty gains come from this exchange. Still, the domestic out-migration from California, Texas, and New York and other High Immigration States is serving as a boon to growth, new jobs, and the repopulation of some areas that have been

Table 4: Net Domestic Migration Rates for Selected Social and Demographic Categories, 1985-90 and 1990-96 High Immigration States

Categories	NET DOMESTIC MIGRATION RATES			
	CALIFORNIA		TEXAS	
	1985-90	1990-96	1985-90	1990-96
TOTAL				
EDUCATION **				
Less than HS	-0.8	-3.7	-1.9	-0.5
HS Grad	-1.0	-5.1	-2.6	0.2
College Grad	3.4	-2.1	-1.8	2.8
POVERTY STATUS				
Poverty	-1.7	-6.6	-2.3	-1.4
Non-Poverty	0.8	-3.5	-2.1	0.9
WHITES - EDUCATION **				
Less than HS	-1.9	-10.3	-2.6	-3.6
HS Grad	-1.4	-6.7	-3.3	0.0
College Grad	3.5	-3.0	-1.8	2.6
WHITES - POVERTY STATUS				
Poverty	-4.0	-16.4	-4.8	-1.8
Non-Poverty	0.8	-5.2	-2.4	0.1

* Non-Latino Whites
** Ages 25 and above

Source: Compiled by author from Special 1990 US Census migration tabulations (1985-90), and from single year migration tabulations (1990-91, 1991-92, 1992-93, 1993-94, 1994-95,1995-96) US Census Bureau Current Population Surveys.

stagnant. Recent evidence suggests that a good part of the emerging "rural renaissance" is being fueled by working-aged, lower skilled, lower-middle income domestic out-migrants from the high immigration regions (Frey and Liaw, 1997).

The major reason that most observers have given to explain this low-skilled "demographic displacement" in High Immigration regions has been tied to the economic competition that recent immigrants represent (Borjas, Freeman, and Katz, 1996). Still, job displacement is only one of several possible ingredients. Another impetus for moving may lie with a common public perception, among residents in these states, that immigrants are imposing an array of social and economic costs -- including higher crime rates, watered-down services, and increased taxes -- that are especially absorbed by poorer and middle class residents. The appeal of California's Proposition 187, which would restrict illegal immigrants' claim on state services (Martin, 1995), and anti-immigrant sentiments expressed in public opinion data (Espenshade and Calhoun, 1993) suggest that there are broader concerns than simply job displacement.

Finally, racial and ethnic prejudice may also be operating for low-skilled domestic out-migration from the increasingly multi-ethnic regions. Prejudice against people from unfamiliar backgrounds has long been known to affect local moves across neighborhoods and between cities and suburbs. This occurred when earlier immigrant waves entered port-of-entry cities, and in the 1950s and 1960s, as middle class whites located away from black neighborhoods and central cities (Lieberson, 1963; Taeuber and Taeuber, 1965; Massey and Denton, 1993). Since an increased multi-ethnic presence now encompasses entire metropolitan areas in today's port-of-entry regions, lower and middle class native born residents who cannot afford to live in gated communities are engaging in a new form of "white flight" (Tilove and Hallinan, 1993; Frey and Tilove, 1995).

Consequences of Demographic Balkanization

The significance of this newly emerging demographic division across regions lies with the consequences it holds for the High Immigration regions themselves, and for new social and demographic cleavages that will develop across the nation. The following sections highlight a few of these consequences.

<u>Dual-Economy Gateways</u>

One consequence from the focused immigration of a relatively large, unskilled population is the emergence of "hourglass economies" within major port-of-entry areas. That is, not only do the new immigrants take existing low-skilled service sector and informal economy jobs, but they have the effect of creating more of them as employers respond to the existence of large pools of relatively low paid labor. By the same token, "complimentary" effects are generated because the kinds of services and occupations taken by the new immigrants tend to benefit industries and administrative activities which tend to attract professionals (mostly native born). The emergence of "world cities" that serve as corporate headquarters in the global marketplace, while also attracting unskilled immigrants, has been written about elsewhere (Sassen, 1996; Waldinger, 1989; 1996; Walker, Ellis, and Barff, 1992; White and Hunter, 1993).

Table 5: 1995 Demographic Profiles by Native Born and Minority Status: Los Angeles CMSA, the 10 High Immigration Metro Areas (combined), and Rest of the US Population

	PERCENT FOREIGN BORN - 1995			PERCENT MINORITIES - 1995		
	LA Metro	High Immig. Metros	Rest of US	LA Metro	High Immig. Metros	Rest of US
Education **						
College Graduate	21	20	8	23	19	11
Some College	25	21	5	33	28	13
High School Graduate	21	18	4	41	36	18
Less Than High School	56	38	7	71	56	23
Family Income #						
Top 25%	23	17	5	34	34	10
Second 25%	34	25	4	51	51	14
Third 25%	47	34	6	63	63	19
Bottom 25%	61	45	9	75	75	31
Age						
Age 18-24	44	27	6	71	54	24
Age 25-34	46	30	7	63	48	22
Age 35-44	38	28	6	52	40	19
Age 45-64	33	26	6	42	35	15
Age 65+	24	22	5	29	23	12
Occupations - Men ##						
Mgr. & Prof.	19	17	5	27	21	10
Clerical & Sales	31	22	4	47	36	14
Service	55	40	7	72	59	27
Skilled Blue Collar	48	30	5	57	40	14
Blue Collar	58	40	7	76	60	23
Occupations - Women ##						
Mgr. & Prof.	20	16	4	32	26	12
Clerical & Sales	22	17	3	44	36	16
Service	51	38	6	74	58	26
Skilled Blue Collar	52	41	6	74	54	21
Blue Collar	71	53	8	78	64	26
Total Ages 18+	38	27	6	51	40	18

Source: Compiled by author from US Census Bureau 1995 Current Population Survey data.
(Note: Area definitions for these metro areas are consistent with OMB June, 1990 standards)

* Population not identified as Non-Latino White

** Ages 25-64

\# Persons ages 18 and above

\#\# Ages 16 and above

What is not as well appreciated is the ensuing race-class bifurcation that will emerge in these areas as middle and lower income domestic migrants elect to locate outside of these areas, and the jobs at the lower rungs of the economic ladder become increasingly dominated by foreign-born and new ethnic minorities. This can be seen in Table 5, which shows how the 1995 foreign-born disproportionately contribute to different demographic groups in Los Angeles and also for all 10 high immigration metropolitan areas. In Los Angeles, for example, the foreign born population comprises 71 percent of women's unskilled blue collar occupations, 58 percent of men's unskilled blue collar occupations, but only about one fifth of profession and managerial jobs. The foreign born population also comprises the lion's share of adults who reside in the bottom quarter of the income scale, and over half of those with less than high school educations. The age distribution makes plain where the future lies, in that metropolitan Los Angeles' foreign born population comprises a larger share of younger adults than older adults.

(Table 5 here)

These disparities among different demographic groups shown for the foreign born population has a parallel with the minority population (right panel, Table 5), especially Hispanics in the Los Angeles metropolitan. While these distinctions are less sharp in New York and the 10 High Immigration metropolitan areas overall than in Los Angeles, they are still apparent and continue to sharpen. In contrast, the foreign born representations and distinctions across these groups for the rest of the U.S. are almost inconsequential. What appears to be emerging is a separate set of metropolitan regions, which are not only forming hour glass economies, but where the race-ethnic groupings vary sharply by class, however measured.

In the past, less-skilled immigrants were able to "bootstrap" their way up the ladder by taking advantage of ethnic niches in the local economy in order to gain wealth and further advancement (Waldinger, 1996). For some groups and highly motivated individuals, this process can still occur (Myers, 1996). But the obstacles for such gains are likely to become more insurmountable for large numbers of unskilled residents residing in dual-economy metropolitan areas with financially strapped public education systems. In an economy where education beyond high school is the key toward advancement, the prospects for breaking down this emerging race-class bifurcation in our large gateway regions, is not promising.

Poverty Displacement

The earlier discussion of demographic displacement within High Immigration regions indicated that the most affected groups were residents with low skills and low incomes. The implication that this holds for addressing the needs of poverty populations both in High Immigration and Low Immigration regions is worthy of some discussion. State officials in High Immigration regions are well aware that immigration contributes substantially to the size of the poverty population in their states and their implications for federal welfare programs has been the subject of much debate (MaCurdy and O'Brien-Strain, 1997). Much less appreciated is how the demographics of the poverty populations in these High Immigration regions will differ from

other parts of the country as a result of both new immigrants in poverty arriving *and* poor domestic residents departing.

One group that is especially worthy of focus is the child poverty population. This population will continue to increase nationally, both because of the rise in the number of children and because of high rates of child poverty (Children's Defense Fund, 1997). The geographic mobility dynamics of families with poor children are also important as they affect the sizes and demographic attributes of poverty children in different states. An example of different migration contributions to child poverty populations is shown in Table 6. In California, New York, and Texas, gains in poor children resulting from immigration over the 1985-90 period occur simultaneously with domestic migration losses. In California, the positive contribution to the former overwhelms the negative contribution of the latter. And in Texas, the immigration of poor children in the late 1980s is more than compensated by domestic out-migration. On the other hand, States like Washington, Wisconsin, and North Carolina gain greater numbers of poor children through domestic migration than they do through immigration.

(Table 6 here)

To what extent does the dominant immigration component of California's child poverty population affect the social and demographic character of this population? The bottom portion of Table 6 provides clues by contrasting the demographic profiles of poor immigrant children with those of poor domestic children who are leaving. The former group is dominated largely by Hispanics and to a lesser extent, Asians, compared with mostly whites among the out-migrants. The poor immigrant child population is also less well versed in English language skills than the out-migrants. An important difference between the two groups involves their family characteristics. The vast majority of poor immigrant children are in married couple households, whereas almost half of the out-migrants live with only one parent.

This comparison indicates a broader difference that is emerging between the child poverty populations in High Immigration versus other parts of the country, according to 1996 Current Population Survey data. Less than half (47 percent) of poor children living within the 10 High Immigration metropolitan areas were native born by native parentage, compared with four out of five poor children in the rest of the country. Almost half of the former poor children (46 percent) were Hispanic, compared with 20 percent in the rest of the country. In Los Angeles, over half of the children living in poverty (51 percent) lived in married couple families, compared with only 22 percent in large metropolitan areas that were not one of the 10 immigrant magnets. These distinct demographics emerging with the child poverty populations in High Immigration regions of the country hold implications for the kinds of schooling and social services required to serve these populations, in contrast to the child poverty populations in other parts of the country. In the former areas, greater emphasis might be given to assimilation and bilingual education in the schools. In the latter areas, more special problems with female-headed families gaining access to schooling and jobs might be emphasized.

Table 6: Children in Poverty: Foreign Immigration and Net Inter-State Migration Components for Selected States and California Profile

State Demographic Categories	1985-90 Migration Components	
	Immigration from Abroad	Net Domestic Migration
Selected States		
California	100,754	-16,004
New York	32,699	-13,724
Texas	28,830	-36,308
Washington	6,549	15,161
Wisconsin	4,903	12,704
North Carolina	1,086	12,271
California Demographic Profile		
Race-Ethnicity		
Whites	13,942	-18,497
Blacks	1,405	-1,878
Hispanics	57,565	-4,438
Asians	27,662	9,828
Family Type-Head		
Married Couple	77,688	-7,638
Male Head	5,865	-1,263
Female Head	17,201	-7,103
English Language		
English Not Well	51,878	3,020
English Well	45,222	3,507
Only English at Home	3,654	-22,531
Nativity		
Native Born-Native Parent	na	-21,365
Native Born-Foreign Parent	na	735
Foreign Born	100,754	4,626

Source: Summarized from Frey, 1997.

Population Aging: The Racial Generation Gap

One demographic attribute of the immigrant population that makes an immediate impact on its destination area is its "younger" age distribution. The lion's share of immigrants, at their time of arrival, is comprised of young adults and their children. In noting these patterns, commentators and scholars have suggested that continued immigration may serve to lessen the impending age dependency burden after the baby boomers retire in the year 2012 (Wattenberg, 1997; Smith and Edmonston, 1997) when a "nation of Florida's" is expected to emerge (Peterson, 1996). What would seem to be a sensible solution to the age dependency crisis from a national perspective fails to consider two items. First, immigration's impact will be much more dominant in the High Immigration regions, both in its magnitude and how it affects the race-ethnic composition of the future working-aged population. Second, ethnic minorities, which comprise large shares of the new immigrant waves, may be less concerned about elderly dependency than they are about child dependency in light of their own demographic patterns.

Turning to the second issue first, it appears likely that, for the foreseeable future, Hispanics, Asians, and blacks will be more concerned about taking care of their children than their elderly. This is evident from the graphics displayed in Figure 6, which show the projected elderly dependency ratios and child dependency ratios for the period 1995 through 2025 for major race-ethnic groups. It is clear that, of the four, only whites will see a "crossover" wherein the elderly dependency ratio will overtake the child dependency ratio. This occurs soon after the baby boomers start passing their sixty fifth birthday in large numbers. Among blacks, Asians, and especially Hispanics, a major dependency burden will focus on children and this will continue well into the next century, probably beyond the time that the last white baby boomer turns sixty-five.

(Figure 6 here)

These dependency ratios that were drawn from nationwide statistics hold important implications for the way immigrant and non-immigrant regions view elderly dependency to be a concern. To make the point, we "fast-forward" current immigration aging and fertility patterns using the Census Bureau's projections to contrast California's age and race profile with that of Utah in the year 2025 (see Figure 7).[3] With this scenario, California's working aged population and its child population show whites to be in the substantial minority, despite the fact that California's elderly population is still 51 percent white. For Utah, in contrast, whites hold the majority among each age group with Hispanics and Asians making small inroads into the under-65 groups. The point is that in States like California, where Hispanics hold a dominant share of the working-aged and child populations and whites are in the minority: How willingly will working-aged Hispanics, Asians, and even African-Americans contribute local, state and federal funds to support the elderly population's welfare concerns?

(Figure 7 here)

FIGURE 6

Projected Child Dependency and Elderly Dependency Ratios, US, 1995-2025 for Race-Ethnic Groups



FIGURE 7

Projected year 2025 Race-Ethnic Compositions for Child, Working Age, Elderly Populations



Thus, any national projections (such as the ones shown at the bottom of Figure 7) tend to camouflage different situations in High Immigration versus Low Immigration regions. While the present discussion has focused on elderly and youth dependency, the sharp race-ethnic demographic distinctions that are emerging in the working aged populations *and* the voting aged populations hold important implications for a variety of national issues that will take on strong region-based constituencies.

New Marital States

Discussions of immigrant assimilation adhering to the "melting pot" metaphor often point to the increased tendency of groups to intermarry as a signal that assimilation is taking place (Gordon, 1964). It is not surprising, therefore, that commentators and academics have placed a watchful eye on the extent to which the new immigrant minorities -- Hispanics and Asians -- have begun to intermarry with members of the largely native-born white and black population. Although mixed race marriages for these groups are still quite rare (Qian, 1997), signs that they are increasing are taken as evidence that these groups are becoming part of the American melting pot (Harrison and Bennett, 1995; Farley, 1996). This "blending of America" has been characterized as a quiet demographic counter-revolution (Stanfield, 1997). The recent National Academy Panel on Immigration has observed that the boundaries between such groups may blur in the future, and that the core American culture has absorbed a number of groups who were defined as racially different in the past, and it may do so again in the future (Smith and Edmonston, 1997).

These observations that some mixed race marriages are occurring among Hispanics and Asians and that this may portend their further assimilation does not necessarily conflict with this paper's view that distinctly different immigrant, foreign-born dominant regions will develop apart from other parts of the country. Indeed, one might expect high levels of intermarriage between these and other groups *within* the High Immigration regions of the country. Here, groups will be more likely to interact in school and work places and become more appreciative of their different backgrounds and lifestyles. The kind of "melting pot" which one identifies with early twentieth century immigrants in urban areas like New York or Chicago may well replicate itself in much of California, Texas, and southern Florida. The question remains as to whether such intermarriage patterns will be both prevalent and acceptable in those parts of the country that remain largely white or white and black.

The assertion that mixed-race marriages involving Hispanics and Asians remain highly clustered in distinct regions is given support by the data shown in Figure 8. Depicted here is the distribution across States of young mixed-race marriages where one or both spouses are under age 35 compiled from the 1990 US census. When one includes marriages of any combination of races, California stands out as the dominant leader with fully a quarter of all the mixed-race marriages in the nation (by comparison, less than 12 percent of all young marriages -- same race or mixed race -- are located in California). The next highest States are Texas, Florida, and New York -- States with large immigrant populations. In fact, these four States represent almost half of the nation's total mixed-race marriages in 1990. California comprises an even higher share of

Distribution of Young Mixed-Race Marriages by State 1990

(Married Couples with one or both spouses under 35)



FIGURE 8

mixed-race marriages involving Hispanics and Asians (27.6 percent and 31.5 percent, respectively, of the nation's marriages for these groups).

(Figure 8 here)

Clearly, the phenomenon of mixed-race marriages involving new immigrant groups is just beginning to emerge and undoubtedly will be the subject of considerable future research. The evidence that exists now makes plain that the vast majority of these marriages occurs in California -- the nation's premiere immigrant State -- and is highly clustered in other "immigrant magnets."

Toward One America or Two?

This paper has argued that the incorporation of the nation's new immigrant ethnic minorities into a single "One America" melting pot will be forestalled by the continued clustering of immigrant groups within broad regions of the country which are no longer attracting large numbers of domestic migrants and longer-term residents. The populations of these High Immigration regions will become increasingly multicultural, younger, and more bifurcated in their race and class structures. In contrast, regions that are gaining population largely from domestic migration and those with stagnating populations will become far less multicultural in their demographic compositions and will differ in other social, demographic and political dimensions as well.

While immigrant minorities have historically clustered in individual neighborhoods or inner cities, the new demographic balkanization is significant because of its geographic scope. The emergence of entire metropolitan areas or labor market regions that are distinct from the rest of the country in their race-ethnicity, age and class profiles represent a new dimension and one that is not likely to change in light of the nation's ongoing immigration and settlement patterns. Assuming that these will continue through the year 2025 (see Figure 9), 12 States will have populations that are less than sixty percent white. Most of these have overrepresentations of at least two major minority groups (among Hispanics, Asians, blacks, American Indians). At the same time, 25 States have white populations that make up at least three-quarters of their total and in 12 of these, the white population exceeds eighty-five percent. Between these extremes lie States, mostly in the south, which have large white and black populations.

(Figure 9 here)

These projections provide only a cursory glimpse of race-ethnic disparities across States without filling in the details of specific race and ethnic groups, age structures, class patterns, etc. While they make strong assumptions about the continuation of current migration and incorporate same-race -- ethnicity marriage patterns,[4] the portrait they paint of the nation's emerging regional demographic divisions, contrast sharply with those that have characterized most of the present century.

While this new demographic balkanization serves as a *regional* divide, our use of this term is not meant to imply that increased divisions will occur between different race and ethnic groups. In fact, the concentration of large numbers of new race and ethnic minorities along with whites and blacks within the High Immigration regions should lead to a greater incorporation of these groups into new American melting pots that will emerge distinctly within these regions. The nature of this incorporation involving a large number of groups as diverse as Mexicans, Central Americans, Koreans, Indians, Vietnamese and others may take a different form than the familiar patterns of the Irish, Italians, Poles and Jews at the previous turn of the century. The higher levels of residential segregation for these new groups within port-of-entry regions (Frey and Farley, 1996; Clark, 1996) their entrenchment in well-defined occupational niches (Waldinger, 1996), and, for some groups, extremely low levels of political clout (Estrada, 1996) will make their road to full economic and political incorporation long and arduous. Still, the

Projected White Populations For States

Year 2025



FIGURE 9

increasing levels of intermarriage which appear to be occurring within High Immigration regions, and evidence that second generation children are more likely to speak English well, and identify as hyphenated Americans (Portes and Rumbaut, 1996) suggests a potential for acculturation and mobility beyond segmented residence and workplace environments. The increased interaction between these groups and longer-term resident whites, blacks and other race-ethnic minorities will bring about conflict but also will create new melting pots that will exist *only* within these broader High Immigration regions -- and the mix will take different forms in each region.

In contrast, the rest of America will include: booming economic growth engines that attract large numbers of domestic white and black migrants such as those that now exist in much of the South Atlantic region and in the Rocky Mountain States; as well as other parts of the country which are experiencing stagnating growth. The demographic profiles of both will be largely older, whiter and more middle class than the more vibrant, younger multi-ethnic regions described above. New region-based political constituencies will emerge that place greater emphasis on middle class tax breaks, the solvency of the Social Security system, and cast a wary eye on too much federal government regulation. Already these regions are becoming more conservative and more likely to vote Republican (Barone, 1997). Their residents will become far less energized over issues such as preserving affirmative action laws, extending the federal safety net to new foreign-born generations or maintaining bilingual education in the schools. Taking cognizance of this new geography, marketers will need to pay just as much attention to metropolitan and regional demographics as they do to local zip codes when targeting advertisements to consumers. More important, the new sensitivity in race-ethnic blending that will begin to percolate in the High Immigration regions will spill over only marginally, if at all, in this other America.

Some readers may view this new demographic balkanization with trepidation since it does not conform to the single "One America" ideal which we have held for much of the nation's history. They may wish to propose solutions to this "problem." Yet, the most obvious solutions would take draconian measures that are almost impossible to execute in the realpolitik of today's America.

One such measure would be to drastically alter immigration to the United States in such a way that it would reduce the large number of less educated migrants who are most prone to become anchored in the low-skilled service and manufacturing economies of High Immigration regions. This would mean either reducing the overall numbers of immigrants, changing the countries of origin of immigrants, or altering the preference system in such a way that low-skilled immigrants do not comprise a large segment of the immigrant pool each year. Although there may be some sentiment toward lowering, somewhat, the overall immigration levels, it is not likely that there will be a constituency to retreat from the more "open" country-of-origin provisions instituted in 1965. Likewise, there is little support to drastically alter the family reunification provisions of current immigration law which account for at least two-thirds of legal immigrants and has been purported to contribute to the declining relative education attainment of the overall immigrant flow (Borjas, 1994; Smith and Edmonston, 1997). Finally, illegal immigration has contributed significantly to the flow of lower-skilled immigrants especially in California. Several legal mechanisms, most notably the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control

Act (IRCA) have attempted to curtail illegal immigrants through employer sanctions, increased border enforcement and other means. However, the lack of strong enforcement and the availability of only modest government resources have rendered these measures relatively ineffective.

The simple fact seems to be that there are enough interest groups and constituencies -- employers, consumers and co-ethnics -- that are benefitting from existing inflows of low-skilled immigration so as to curtail measures that would substantially alter the provisions of legal immigration, or drastically reduce illegal immigration (Waldinger, 1996). Local political interests are also weighed. California Governor Pete Wilson rode an anti-immigrant stance to the favor of his largely white, native-born constituency in the mid-1990s; at the same time that New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani took a pro-immigrant stance to receive support from his increasingly large foreign-born constituency. Beyond what may or may not be accomplished through changes in immigration laws or enforcement, an extended network of immigration is already established between selected origin and destination communities in Mexico and the United States, having evolved over decades with strong economic and social roots (Massey, 1995). These flows are likely to expand over time rather than diminish in response to any token changes in US immigration policy.

The second set of policy measures which would need to be enacted to curtail the demographic balkanization patterns now in place would involve Herculean federal efforts to prepare new waves of immigrant children for mainstream jobs that are available outside of their established ethnic enclaves and employment niches. Unlike large earlier immigrant waves, new immigrants and their children face a two-tiered economy where a college education is essential for upward mobility. Yet, the economies in immigrant regions are highly bifurcated. As has been shown, foreign-born workers comprise well over half of all service and blue collar jobs in the Los Angeles metropolitan region, but hold less than one-fifth of professional or managerial positions. This picture will only change for future generations if drastic measures are introduced in local high schools and community colleges to prepare the children of the next generation to move not only upward but outward from the unique port-of-entry labor markets that surround them. Yet, here again, the current political climate favors devolution of federal and even State responsibilities for education and social services to the local communities. Because these communities bear the greatest financial burdens and receive precious little of the financial benefits of new immigrant waves, measures to improve their upward mobility are not likely to be put in place any time soon.

It appears inevitable that the demographic balkanization scenario, portrayed here, will continue and become more entrenched over the decades ahead. The new High Immigration zones will be distinct and constitute the Twenty-First Century version of America's melting pots -- ensconced largely in California, Texas and the southwest, southern Florida, the upper eastern seaboard and Chicago. The cultural and demographic tapestry evolving in this America will differ sharply from the older, more middle class and whiter, indeed more suburban, America that exists elsewhere. The distinctly different social geographies of these two Americas are not widely appreciated by commentators and scholars. Both the recommendations of a bipartisan Commission on Immigration Reform (US Commission on Immigration Reform, 1997) and an

influential book (Salins, 1997) argue that the "Americanization" of new immigrants should get high priority by emphasizing greater efforts toward immigrant naturalization, English literacy and the primacy of individual over group rights so as to achieve a common civic culture. Yet these pronouncements make no mention of the fact that much of "mainstream" America represents another America that lies well beyond the settlements of most new immigrants. To achieve these laudable goals and to understand the nation's evolving demographic realities of the Twenty-First Century, scholars and policy makers will need to reconcile how the two Americas portrayed in this paper will relate to each other, socially, economically, and politically.

FOOTNOTES

[1] The terms "domestic migration" and "internal migration" are used interchangeably to note within-US migration as contrasted with immigration. Net domestic migration (or net internal migration) refers to a residual of in-migrants to an area from another part of the US minus out-migrants from an area to another part of the US. Most domestic (or internal) migrants were born in the US although, due to data limitations, these statistics include a small number of foreign-born domestic migrants. Separate analyses (not shown) indicate that the general patterns for all domestic migrants reflect those for native-born domestic migrants, and we interpret the former patterns as if they pertain to the latter.

[2] This research shows that, when other relevant economic and amenity variables are added to the analysis, immigration shows a significant independent effect on domestic out-migration. Studies of 1985-90 net domestic migration for metropolitan areas (Frey, 1995b) and for States (Frey, 1995c) show that immigration exerts a significant effect on out-migration, which is strongest for persons in poverty and with less than a college education. More rigorous analyses, which separate the explanation of migration departures out of a State from the explanation of migrants' destination selections (Frey et al., 1996; Frey and Liaw, 1998) show that immigration's impact is greater on the departure part of the migration process, providing support for the view that it is more likely to serve as a "push" rather than as a reduced "pull."

Other studies using similar analysis techniques for migration over the late 1970s (Walker, Ellis and Barff, 1992; Filer, 1992; White and Hunter, 1993) and for the 1980s (White and Liang, 1994) show general but not uniformly consistent support for an immigration effect on internal out-migration of less-skilled residents. One study of net migration for metropolitan areas over the 1985-90 period (Wright, Ellis and Reibel, 1997) shows inconsistent effects which depend on the nature of the specification.

[3] These projections were compiled by the author from the US Bureau of the Census (Population Division, Electronic Product, and PE-45) using methodology discussed in "Population Projections for States by Age, Sex, Race and Hispanic Origin, 1995 to 2025" (PPL-47, October 1996, US Bureau of the Census), following Series A. The migration components are predicated, in part, on modeling based on observed Internal Revenue Service migration streams from 1975-76 through 1994-95 and tabulations of the "residence 5 years ago" question on the 1990 decennial census. The immigration component assumes a net annual immigration of 820,000 (685,000 legal immigrants, 115,000 refugee immigrants, 225,000 undocumented immigrants, 5000 Puerto Rican immigrants, and 10,000 civilian citizens reduced by 220,000 emigrants) throughout the projection period.

[4] See Footnote 3 for the methodology. Note, that these projections assume same-race marriages such that children take on the race of their parents. While this tends to understate mixed-race marriages, such marriages would be more likely to occur in the most ethnically diverse States (discussed earlier in the text) where the pool of potential non-white partners is largest.

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